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Interest Groups in American Public Law
Cass R. Sunstein*
The bicentennial of the Constitution is approaching in a time
of considerable dissatisfaction with the American scheme of governance. The dissatisfaction takes various forms, but many of the
concerns have a common root in the problems produced by the
existence of interest groups, or "factions," and their influence
over the political process. The scheme is challenged on the
grounds that it allows powerful private organizations to block
necessary government action;' that the lawmaking process has
been transformed into a series of accommodations among competing elites; 2 and that the rise of a large bureaucracy exercising
broad discretionary power has undermined original constitutional goals by circumventing the safeguards of separation of
3
powers and electoral accountability.
The problem of faction has been a central concern of constitutional law and theory since the time of the American Revolution. Madison made control of factions the centerpiece of his
defense of the proposed Constitution. His antifederalist opponents objected on the ground that his solution was a false one,
addressing only a symptom of the underlying problem. This de*
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1. See, e.g., T. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM (2d ed. 1979).
2. See, e.g., THE BIAS OF PLURALISM (W. Connolly ed. 1969); FRONTIERS OF DEMOCRATIC
THEORY (H. Kariel ed. 1970).

3. See, e.g., J. FREEDMAN, CIusIs AND LEGITIMACY (1978); Stewart, The Reformation ofAmerican Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1667 (1975).
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bate has been recapitulated in various forms throughout constitutional history.
The central purpose of this article is to link three seemingly
disparate areas of public law theory. The first area is the Madisonian understanding4 of politics and the role of representatives
in counteracting the problems posed by the existence of factions.
The second is legal doctrine interpreting a number of constitutional provisions, particularly the equal protection clause. That
doctrine is best understood as an attempt to impose on government a particular conception of politics, with powerful Madisonian overtones. The third area is judge-made doctrine under
the Administrative Procedure Act 5 and other statutes governing
the conduct of regulatory agencies. Much of administrative law
doctrine is also intended to respond to the problem of faction by
ensuring a particular sort of behavior from public officials. All
three areas reflect the same basic conception of politics and of
the proper role of national representatives. That conception retheories about how
pudiates some of the most prominent current
6
government does and should operate.
At the normative level, the purpose of this article is to help
revive 7 aspects of an attractive conception of governance-we
may call it republican 8-to point out its often neglected but
4. As indicated below, the term "Madisonian" is used in a distinct sense; it does not
refer to the now well-established (but in my view erroneous) pluralist understanding. See, e.g.,
R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First
Amendment Problems, 47 IND. LJ. 1 (1971).
5. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (1982).
6. The most important such theory is pluralism. See, e.g., R. DAHL, supra note 4; Stigler,
The Theoy of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL. J. EcoN. & Mobrr. ScI. 3 (1971).
7. The republican understanding is in the midst of a general revival in various disciplines. In history, see, e.g., J. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT (1975); Pocock, Virtues,
Rights, and Manners: A Model for Historians of Political Thought, 9 POL. THEORY 353 (1981); in
political theory, see, e.g., A. MAcIm'RE, AFTER VIRTUE (2d ed. 1984); LIBERALISM AND ITS
CRrIcs (M. Sandel ed. 1984); Gutmann, Communitarian Critics of Liberalism, 14 PHIL. & PUB.
AFT. 308 (1985); in sociology, see M.JAseowrrz, THE RECONSTITUTION OF PATRIOTISM: EDUCATION FOR CIcC CONSCIOUSNESS (1983); R. BELLAH, R. MADSEN, W. SuIVAN, A. SWINDLER, &
S. TIPTON, HABITS OF THE HEART (1985); in law, see Michelman, Politics and Values or What's
Really Wrong with Rationality Review?, 13 CREIGHTON L. REv. 487 (1980); Stewart, Regulation in a
Liberal State: The Role of Non-Commodity Values, 92 YALE LJ. 1537 (1983). This revival may be a
part of more general trends. For overviews, see R. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIsM (1983); F. DALmAYR, PouIs AND PRAXIS (1984).
8. For present purposes, it is unnecessary to distinguish among the various kinds of republican thought, though the differences are important and considerable. SeeJ. PocOCK, THE
MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT, supra note 7. Moreover, elements of traditional republican thought
are quite unattractive-especially its militarism and its acceptance of class hierarchies, manifested by the limited classes of people entitled to wield political influence. See Pitkin,Justice:
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nonetheless prominent place in the thought of the framers, and
to suggest its availability as a foundation from which judges and
others might evaluate political processes and outcomes. Despite
the ascendancy of other approaches, this conception has continued to influence the judicial mind, even in circumstances in
which it seems utopian. 9 The central commitments of the republican conception are far from anachronistic, and in its belief in a
deliberative conception of democracy, it provides a basis for evaluating administrative and legislative action that has both powerful historical roots and considerable contemporary appeal.
I.

INTRODUCTION: VIRTUE, FACTION, AND CORRUPTION

When the proposed Constitution was debated, the country
faced a choice between two different conceptions of politics. The
first conception was republican. Its animating principle was civic
virtue. To the republicans, the prerequisite of sound government was the willingness of citizens to subordinate their private
interests to the general good.'O Politics consisted of self-rule by
the people; but it was not a scheme in which people impressed
their private preferences on the government. It was instead a system in which the selection of preferences was the object of the
governmental process. Preferences were not to be taken as exogenous, but to be developed and shaped through politics.
To the republicans, the role of politics was above all deliberative. Dialogue and discussion among the citizenry were critical
features in the governmental process. Political participation was
not limited to voting or other simple statements of preference.
The ideal model for governance was the town meeting, a metaphor that played an explicit role in the republican understanding
of politics.11
The republican conception carries with it a particular view of
human nature; it assumes that through discussion people can, in
their capacities as citizens, escape private interests and engage in
pursuit of the public good. In this respect, political ordering is
distinct from market ordering. Moreover, this conception reRelatingPublic to Private,9 Poa. THEORY 327 (1981) (discussing exclusion of women). A revival
of republicanism must attempt to eliminate these elements. See text accompanying notes
112-126, 186-194 infra.
9. See text accompanying notes 84-91 infra.
10. See H. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR 19-23 (1981).
11. See, e.g., 5 THE CoMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 67-69 (H. Storing ed. 1981).
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flects a belief that debate and discussion help to reveal that some
values are superior to others. Denying that decisions about values are merely matters of taste, the republican view assumes that
"practical reason" can be used to settle social issues. 12
With this understanding, the problem of faction assumes a
distinct form and has a distinct solution. The problem is rooted
in corruption: the elimination of civic virtue and the pursuit of
self-interest by political actors. If corruption occurs, groups
seeking to use government power to promote their own private
ends might come to dominate the political process. If private
groups were permitted to subvert government in this way, political power would supplant political discussion and debate. Corruption thus threatens to undermine the republican conception
of politics. The traditional solution is to instill principles of virtue in the hope of ensuring that the spirit of faction will not develop.13 Education and prevailing morality therefore provide the
principal lines of defense against the dangers of faction.
Distinct from the republican understanding of government is
a competing conception that might be called pluralist. 14 Under
the pluralist view, politics mediates the struggle among self-interested groups for scarce social resources. Only nominally deliberative, politics is a process of conflict and compromise among
various social interests. Under the pluralist conception, people
come to the political process with preselected interests that they
seek to promote through political conflict and compromise. Preferences are not shaped through governance, but enter into the
process as exogenous variables.
The pluralist conception treats the republican notion of a separate common good as incoherent, potentially totalitarian, or
both. 15 The common good consists of uninhibited bargaining
among the various participants, so that numbers and intensities
of preferences can be reflected in political outcomes. The com12. See note 124 infra on the subject of "practical reason"; C.fJ. ELSTER, SouR GRAPES
35-42 (1983) (discussidg preference-transforming function of politics).
13. See, for example, Jefferson's view: "Enlighten the people generally, and tyranny and
oppressions of body and mind will vanish like evil spirits at the dawn of day." 14 THE WarrINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 491 (A. Lipscomb & A. Bergh eds. 1903).
14. See, e.g., A. BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT (1908); R. DAHL, supra note 4; D.
TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS (1963). For the economic view, see Peltzman, Toward

a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976); Stigler, supra note 6.
15. SeeJ. SCHUMPETER, CAPrrAIiSM, SoCIAusM, AND DEMOCRACY (1950). Cf THE FED-

ERALXST No. 10 (J. Madison) (suggesting that an effort to extirpate tactions through removing
their cause is a cure worse than the disease) (P. Ford ed. 1898).

HeinOnline -- 38 Stan. L. Rev. 32 1985-1986

November 1985]

INTEREST GROUPS

mon good amounts to an aggregation of individual preferences.
Moreover, efforts to alter or shape preferences-through, for example, the education so prized by the republican tradition-may
assume the status of tyranny.
Under the pluralist conception, the problem of faction arises
from the possibility that one group, or an alliance of groups, will
dominate the legislative or executive process and subvert the bargaining and compromise on which the model is based. Factional
domination effectively deprives other groups of the opportunity
to assert their views. If it were permitted to occur, the political
process would be undermined and freedom would be at risk.
There are several possible solutions to the problem of faction.
One response would be to create a shield of "rights"-spheres of
individual autonomy into which government may not enter. 16
Such a solution would deflect factional tyranny, whether by a majority or by a minority, by declaring certain areas to be off limits
to legislators. This shield of autonomy could protect a number
of different interests, ranging from rights of traditional private
property to protection against discrimination on the basis of race
or gender. But whatever its coverage, the shield would apply regardless of the legitimacy of governmental ends. 17
Another response would be to accept the pluralist conception
of politics as descriptively accurate, but conclude that it is no
cause for alarm. This view would allow politics to consist of
uninhibited interest-group struggle in the expectation that the
struggle will promote social welfare better than any alternative
system.' 8 Political ordering is, in this view, assimilated to market
ordering. Both the variety and the intensity of preferences would
be factored into the political pressures imposed on representa16. This approach has played a prominent role in both private and public law. In private
law, the common law system may be understood as an effort to recognize and protect a realm
of private autonomy. See, e.g., Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2J. LEGAL STuD. 151 (1973).
The Lochner era is the public law analogue: rights of property and contract were employed as
a shield against pluralist invasion. B. Aci EmuA, SocIALJusTcE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980)
and, especially, R. DwoRKIN, TAKING RIGnTS SERiousLY (1977), may be understood as efforts

to adapt rights-based understandings to the modem regulatory state. For critiques, see A.
BuciwA, MARX AND JUsTICE (1982); Hardwig, Should Women Think in Terms of Rights?, 94
Enmics 441 (1984); Symposium: A Critique of Rights, 62 TEx. L. Rxv. 1363 (1984).
17. See the discussion of the police power in R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY
AND THE LAw OF EmNENT DOMAIN 107-45 (1985). Of course, such rights can be invaded if the

government is able to generate a sufficiently powerful justification.
18. See Becker, A Theoy of Competition Among PressureGroupsfor PoliticalInfluence, 98 Q..
ECON. 371 (1983).
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tives. The representatives would be expected to respond rather
mechanically to those pressures. 19 This market-like mechanism
would promote aggregate social welfare through an "invisible
hand" like that found in other markets. 20 In the view of many,
this understanding lies at the core of majority rule. 2 ' By denying
that the existence of factions poses a problem for democratic theory, this approach accepts the pluralist model not only descriptively, but normatively as well.
A third possible response to the problem of faction would
modify the second by accepting large elements of the pluralist
conception and incorporating the concern that certain groups
are effectively "fenced out" of the pluralist process 22 because
they are unable to participate in political bargaining. Sometimes
this disability is attributed to the "discreteness and insularity" of
the excluded groups. 23 The attribution is questionable, for discreteness and insularity may increase rather than impair the opportunities for the exercise of political power. 24 Disability is also
attributed to dispersion and lack of political organization. 25 The
critical point is that it may be possible to accept many of the elements of the pluralist model, while also concluding that steps
must be taken to protect certain disadvantaged groups.
Yet another response to the problem of faction would structure the processes of representation to ensure against the likelihood of factional tyranny. The structural mechanisms would
insulate representatives, to a greater or lesser degree, from constituent pressures, in the hope that they will deliberate more effectively on the public good. Unlike the alternative solutions, the
structural response represents a repudiation of the premises of
19. This is a familiar if controversial view of representation. See H. PrriN, THE CONCEvP'r
198-208 (1967).
20. This understanding, prominent among modem pluralists, has been attributed to
Madison himself. See, e.g., Adair, The Tenth FederalistRevisited, 8 WM. & MARY Q. 48 (1951);
Note, A Madisonian Interpretationof the Equal Protection Clause, 93 YAI. LJ. (1984). For general
discussion, see Bourke, The PluralistReading ofJames Madison's Tenth Federalist, 9 PERSP. AM.
HisT. 269 (1975).
21. See A. DowNs, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957).
22. This approach accounts for large areas of modem constitutional law. See United
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see generally J. ELY, DEMOCRACY
AN DxSTRUST (1980) (attempting to use this principle as the basis for a conception of politics
and of the proper judicial role).
23. For the dassic formulation, see CaroleneProducts, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
24. See Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REv. 713 (1985) (suggesting that
diffuseness is sometimes more likely to weaken political influence than "discreteness").
25. See R. HARDIN, CoLuarxvE ACTnON (1982).
OF REPRESENTATION
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pluralism and, as discussed below, might be understood as a variation on the republican understanding as it has been defined
here.
II.

THE HISTORICAL ARTICULATION:

FEDERALISTS,

ANTIFEDERALISTS

It should come as no surprise that many of these ideas played
a central role in the debates over the framing and ratification of
the Constitution. In particular, the debate between the federalists and the antifederalists focused on the respective roles of civic
virtue, interest groups, and political pressure in the process of
governance. In tracing these themes, I make no claim to special
originality, 26 though the account offered here differs from some
prominent readings in significant ways. 27 Moreover, it will be
necessary to paint with a broad brush, avoiding detailed discussion of the significant differences among both the antifederalists
and the framers. 28 The major purpose is to suggest the nature
and origins of the federalist understanding of politics and representation, an understanding that has played an important role in
judge-made public law ever since.
A.

The Antifederalist Case

In recent years, there has been a resurgence of enthusiasm for
the arguments of the antifederalists-opponents of the proposed
Constitution who claimed that the document amounted to a betrayal of the principles underlying the Revolution. 29 The animating principle of the antifederalists was civic virtue or "public
26. For similar views, see D. EPSTEIN, THE PoLrrICAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST (1984);
Bessette, Deliberative Democracy: The Majority Prnciple in Republican Government, in How DEMOCRATIC IS THE CONSTITrUTION? 102 (R. Goldwin & W. Schambra eds. 1980); Morgan, Madison's
Theory of Representationin the Tenth Federalist, 36 J. PoL. 852 (1974).
27. See, e.g., J. DIGGINS, THE LoST SouL or AMERICAN POLTIcS: VIRTUE, SELF-ImE ST,
AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF LIBERALISM (1984); H. PrrTIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION
191-96 (1967); Adair, supra note 20; Ackerman, The Storr Lectures: Discovering the Constitution,
93 YALE LJ. 1013 (1984); Diamond, Ethics and Politics: The American Way, in THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 39 (R. Horwitz 2d ed. 1979).
28. See note 42 infra.
29. For general discussion, see J.T. MAIN, THE ANTFEDERALISTS (1961); H. STORING,
supra note 10; THE COMPLE ANIT-FEDERALIST, supra note 11; Kenyon, Men of Little Faith. The
Anti-federalists on the Nature of Representative Government, 12 WM. & MARY Q.3 (1955).
The position of the antifederalists was hardly monolithic; there were many disagreements
among them. For an overview, see Finkelman, Book Review, 70 CoRNLL.L. REv. 182 (1984).
In outlining the antifederalist position, it is necessary to overlook those differences and to
speak of general tendencies.
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happiness." Governmental outcomes were, in this view, to be determined by citizens devoted to a public good separate from the
struggle of private interests; and government's first task was to
ensure the flourishing of the necessary public-spiritedness.
Moreover, the antifederalists believed in decentralization. Only
in small communities would it be possible to find and develop the
unselfishness and devotion to the public good on which genuine
freedom depends. Participation in government was a positive
good, providing a kind of "happiness" that could be found nowhere else.30 In these respects, the antifederalists echoed traditional republican theory.
The antifederalists were therefore hostile to the idea of a dramatic expansion in the powers of the national government. Only
a decentralized society would allow the homogeneity and dedication to the public good that would prevent the government from
degenerating into a clash of private interests. A powerful national government would create heterogeneity and distance from
the sphere of power and thereby undermine the public's willingness to participate in politics as citizens.
Adhering to the traditional republican view, the antifederalists argued that civil society should operate as an educator, and
not merely as a regulator of private conduct. 3 ' Government bore
the responsibility of inculcating attitudes that would incline the
citizenry away from the pursuit of self-interest, at least in the
political realm. Closely connected to this vision was the antifederalists' desire to avoid extreme disparities in wealth, education,
or power. Such disparities would poison the spirit of civic virtue
and prevent achievement of the homogeneity of a simple and vir2
tuous people.3
It is not difficult to see why the antifederalists had an ambiva30. This is the foundation for Hannah Arendt's reading of the American Revolution and
its aftermath, see H. ARENDT, ON REVOLuTION (1963).
31. Similarities between the antifederalists' views and those of Rousseau are readily apparent. Surprisingly, however, Rousseau's name seldom appeared in the antifederalist literature and is mentioned only once in THE COMPLEm ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 11, see 4 idL at
251-52 (Essay by a Newport Man, describing Rousseau as "a republican by birth and education, one of the most exalted geniuses and one of the greatest writers of his age, or perhaps
any age" and referring especially to Rousseau's suggestion "that the people should examine
and determine every public act themselves"). See generally SpuRLm, RoussEAu IN AMERICA,
1760-1809 (1969).
32. See Krouse, "Classical"Images of Democracy in Ame ica: Madison and Tocqueville, in DFzaoCRATIC THEORY AND PRACTICE 58 (G. Duncan ed. 1983). See also C. MoNTEsq.uEu, THE Spmrr
OF THE LAws, book V (1748) (especially chapters 2-7).
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lent attitude toward a system in which decisions were made by
representatives of the people rather than by the people themselves. In their ideal world, all decisions would be made during a
face-to-face process of deliberation and debate. Such a process
would inculcate civic virtue in the public at large, virtue from
which the process itself would simultaneously benefit. The result
would be "public happiness" 3 3-the happiness that derives from
active participation in the world of governance.3 4 Thus Jefferson
proposed that the Constitution should be amended every generation, partly to promote general attention to public affairs. 35
But the antifederalists acknowledged that representation was
necessary at both the state and national levels. They recognized
that the size of government made it impossible to conduct political affairs on the model of the town meeting.3 6 For them, representation was a necessary evil brought about by the
37
impracticability of direct self-governance by the people.
From this perspective, the grounds on which the antifederalists based their opposition to the proposed Constitution should
be clear. They believed that the Constitution would destroy the
system of decentralization on which true liberty depended. The
citizens would lose effective control over their representatives;
they would also be deprived of the opportunity to participate in
public affairs, and thus the principle of civic virtue would be undermined.3 8 Rule by remote national leaders would attenuate
the scheme of representation, rupturing the alliance of interests
between the rulers and the ruled.3 9 The antifederalists foresaw a
system that would effectively exclude the people from the realm
33. See H. AtENDT, supra note 30, at 111-37.
34. See id35. Letter to Samuel Kercheval, July 12, 1816, in THE PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON

553-58 (M. Peterson ed. 1975). Views closely akin to those of Jefferson can be found in
recent suggestions that the distinction between "routine" and "revolution" ought to be broken down. See Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARv. L. REv. 561 (1983); R.
Unger, The Conditions of Public Life (1985) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Stanford
Law Review). See also P. Brest, The Constitution of Democracy (1984) (unpublished
manuscript).
36. See, e.g., H. STORING, supra note 10, at 43-45.
37. See id at 17-18.
38. See, e.g., 2 Ti ComPLE'rE ANTI-FEDERALISr, supra note 11, at 73, 110-111; 4 id at
94-95; 6 id at 160-161. See also Barber, The Compromised Republic: Public Purposelessnessin
America, in Tm MOA-L FOUNDATIONS OF Th AMERICAN RauBiac 19 (R. Horwitz ed. 1977)
(suggesting that exdusion of the citizenry from the processes of government was an important goal of the framers).
39. See Barber, supra note 38.
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of public affairs, and provide weakly accountable national leaders
with enormous discretion to make law.
The antifederalists were also skeptical of the emerging interest in commercial development that had played such a prominent
role in the decision to abandon the Articles of Confederation in
favor of the new Constitution. 40 In the antifederalists' view, commerce was a threat to the principles underlying the Revolution
because it gave rise to ambition, avarice, and the dissolution of
communal bonds. 4 1 Insofar as the proposed Constitution might
be understood as an effort to promote commerce and commercial mores, it would undermine the purposes of the Revolution.
In sum, the antifederalists attacked the proposed Constitution
as inconsistent with the underlying principles of republicanism.
The removal of the people from the political process, the creation of a powerful and remote national government, the new emphasis on commerce-all threatened to eliminate the "public
happiness" for which the Revolution had, in part, been fought.
B.

The FederalistResponse

The antifederalist objections to the proposed Constitution
provoked a theoretical response that amounted to a new conception of politics-indeed, a "political theory worthy of a prominent place in the history of Western thought." 42 This conception
reformulated the principles of republicanism in an attempt to
40. On the need for commercial development, see THE FEDERALIST Nos. 6 & 11 (A.
Hamilton). For the antifederalist response, see 6 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note
11, at 201.
41. See 6 THE COMPLET ANTI-FEDERAMST, supra note 11, at 201 (comparing "independent feelings of ancient republics, whose prime object was the welfare and happiness of their
country" with "peculation ...
usurious contracts .... illegal and dishonest projects, and
. . . every private vice" which might "support the factitious appearances of grandeur and
wealth").

42. G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 615 (1969).
Federalist thought is an amalgam of the ideas of numerous thinkers, many of whom disagreed with each other. There are significant differences among, for example, Morris,
Madison, Hamilton, Wilson, Adams, andJefferson, and perhaps the latter should not be characterized as a federalist at all. Some of the differences are explored in J. HowE, TiE CHANGING PoLmrrcAL THOUGHT OFJOHN ADAMs (1966); G. STouRzH, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE
IDEA OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT (1970); G. WOOD, supra; Katz, Thomas Jefferson and the Right
to Property in Revolutionary America, 19 J.L. & EcON. 467 (1976);J. Nedelsky, Property and the
American Conception of Limited Government (1984) (unpublished manuscript). In the text,
Madison's views are used as the principal source of the theory underlying the Constitution.
This simplification is not intended to suggest that there was substantial consensus among the
Founders.
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synthesize elements of traditional republicanism and its emerging pluralist competition.
Madison's discussion in The Federalist No. 10 is sometimes
thought to be a conventional pluralist document, 43 and there are
indeed traces of pluralism in the analysis. To Madison, the primary problem of governance was the control of faction, understood in his famous formulation as "a number of citizens,
whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who
are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or
of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community." 44 The antifederalists rooted the problem of faction in that of corruption;
their solution was to control the factional spirit and limit the
power of elected representatives. In their view, those close to the
people, chosen locally, would not stray from the people's interests. The civic virtue of the citizenry and of its representatives
would work as a safeguard against factional tyranny.
Madison and other federalists transformed the question of
corruption into that of faction. They saw the "corruption" that
created factions as a natural, though undesirable, product of liberty and inequality in human faculties. This redefinition meant
that the basic problem of governance could not be solved by the
traditional republican means of education and inculcation of virtue. Moreover, the problem of faction was likely to be most, not
least, severe in a small republic. In a small republic, a self-interested private group could easily seize political power and distribute wealth or opportunities in its favor. Indeed, in the view of
the federalists, this was precisely what had happened in the years
since the Revolution. During that period, factions had usurped
the processes of state government, putting both liberty and property at risk. 45 This evidence helped account for Madison's rejection ofJefferson's proposal for regular constitutional amendment
on the grounds that such a proposal would produce "the most
violent struggles . . . between the parties interested in reviving,
and those interested in reforming the antecedent state of property."'46 Jefferson, by contrast, saw turbulence as "productive of
43. See note 20 supra; see also Diamond, supra note 27.
44. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 56 (J. Madison) (P. Ford ed. 1898).
45. See generally J. RAKovE, THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL PoLrrcs (1979); G. WOOD,
supra note 42.
46. See Letter to Jefferson (Feb. 14, 1790), reprinted in THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER:
SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OFJAMES MADISON 232 (M. Meyers rev. ed. 1981).
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good. It prevents the degeneracy of government, and nourishes
a general attention to.

.

. public affairs. I hold.

. .

that a little

rebellion now and then is a good thing." 47
Madison viewed the recent history as sufficient evidence that
sound governance could not rely on traditional conceptions of
civic virtue and public education to guard against factional tyranny. Such devices would be unable to overcome the natural
self-interest of men and women, even in their capacity as political
actors. 48 Self-interest, in Madison's view, would inevitably result
from differences in natural talents and property ownership. 49 To
this point, Madison added the familiar idea that attempting to
overcome self-interest would carry a risk of tyranny of its own.50
Conscious preference-shaping by government would not promote liberty but instead destroy it.51

All this justified rejection of the antifederalist belief that the
problem of faction could be overcome, but it supplied no positive
solution to the problem. In developing a solution Madison was
particularly original. He began with the notion that the problem
posed by factions is especially acute in a direct democracy, for a
"common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by
a majority of the whole," and there will be no protection for the
minority. 52 But a large republic would provide safeguards.
There, the diversity of interests would ensure against the possibility that sufficient numbers of people would feel a common desire to oppress minorities. 53 A large republic thus contained a
built-in check against the likelihood of factional tyranny.
47. Letter to Madison (Jan. 30, 1798), reprintedin THE PORTABLE THOM.ASJEFFERSON 882

(M. Peterson ed. 1975).
48. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison); THE FEDERALIST No. 6, at 28 (A. Hamilton)

(P. Ford ed. 1898) ("men are ambitious, vindicative, and rapacious").
49. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 56-57 (J.Madison) (P. Ford ed. 1898).
50. See id
51. See id Compare Benjamin Rush's suggestion that each citizen should
be taught that he does not belong to himself, but that he is public property. Let him
be taught to love his family, but let him be taught at the same time that he must
forsake and even forget them when the welfare of his country requires it .... From
the observations that have been made it is plain that I consider it as possible to convert men into republican machines. This must be done if we expect them to perform
their parts properly in the great machine of the government of the state.

Rush, A Planfor the Establishment of Public Schools and the Diffiusion of Knowledge in Pennsylvania
(Philadelphia 1786), in 1 AMERiCAN PoLMCAxL WRITNG DUmNG THE FOUNDING ERA
1760-1805, at 684, 687 (C. Hyneman & D. Lutz eds. 1983). See also Stewart, supra note 7.
52. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 15, at 59-60.
53. Id at 62.
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This was not the only virtue of size. In a large republic, the
principle of representation might substantially solve the problem
of faction. In a critical passage, Madison wrote that representation would "refine and enlarge the public views by passing them
through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom
may best discern the true interest of their country and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to
temporary or partial considerations." 54 A large republic would
also reduce the danger that representatives would acquire undue
attachment to local interests.
This conception of representation appears throughout The
Federalist. No. 57 urges that:
The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to
obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and
most virtue to pursue the common good of the society; and in
the next place, to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous whilst they continue to hold their public
trust. 55

Elsewhere, Hamilton suggests that wisdom and virtue would
characterize national representatives. 56 Whereas the antifederalists accepted representation as a necessary evil, Madison regarded it as an opportunity for achieving governance by officials
devoted to a public good distinct from the struggle of private interests. Representatives would have the time and temperament
to engage in a form of collective reasoning. The hope was for a
genuinely national politics. The representatives of the people
would be free to engage in the process of discussion and debate
from which the common good would emerge. This understanding is surprisingly close to the Burkean conception of
54. Id,at 60. Madison continued: "Under such a regulation, it may well happen that the
public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the
public good than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the purpose." Id
55. THE FEDERAuST No. 57, at 377 (A. Hamilton) (P. Ford ed. 1898).
56. THE FEDERALST No. 63 (A. Hamilton). See also Madison's suggestion that:
An auxiliary desideratum for the melioration of the Republican form is such a
process of elections as will most certainly extract from the mass of the Society the
purest and noblest characters which it contains; such as will at once feel most
strongly the proper motives to pursue the end of their appointment, and be most
capable to devise the proper means of attaining it.
J. MADISON, Vi=es of the PoliticalSystem of the United States, in 9 THE PAERS OFJAMES MADISON
Jay).
357 (R. Rutland & W. Rachal eds. 1975); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 3 (J.
For a general discussion of Madisonian representation that stresses the antipluralist
thrust but that substantially understates its skeptical elements, see G. WLLS, EXPLAINING
AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST 177-264 (1981).
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representation. 57
In important respects, the departure from traditional republicanism could not have been greater. Madison willingly abandoned the classical republican understanding that citizens
generally should participate directly in the processes of government. 58 Far from being a threat to freedom, a large republic
could help to guarantee it. At the same time, Madison's understanding was sharply distinct from that of the modern pluralists.
He hoped that national representatives, operating above the fray,
would be able to disentangle themselves from local pressures and
deliberate on and bring about something like an objective public
good. Those representatives would have the virtue associated
with classical republican citizens.
To be sure, Madison's sensitivity to the pressures imposed by
interest groups-the problem of faction- made him unwilling to
accept the antifederalist conception of politics. In his view, that
conception would lead to the domination of politics by factions
under the guise of civic virtue. But his solution was hardly to
accept the interest-group struggle as a desirable part of politics
57. See, e.g., Speech to the Electors (Nov. 3, 1774), reprintedin BURKE'S PoLrrics 116 (R.
Hoffman & P. Levack eds. 1949) ("Parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with
one interest, that of the whole-where not local purposes, not local prejudices, ought to
guide, but the general good, resulting from the general reason of the whole"). See Barber,
supra note 38; S. MILILR, SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS INAMERICAN PoLrrxcs (1983) (discussing
the Burkean elements in Madison's conception of representation).
See also THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 236 (J. Madison) (P. Ford ed. 1898) (referring to the
framers' "deep conviction of the necessity of sacrificing private opinions and partial interests
to the public good"); THE FEDERALIST Nos. 63 & 71 (A. Hamilton). Note in this regard that
Madison attacked Congress in 1787 as "advocates for the respective interests of their constituents." Letter to Jefferson (Oct. 3, 1785), reprintedin 8 THE PAPERS OFJAMES MADISON, supra
note 56, at 374. In his view, "[tihe evil is fully displayed in the County representations, the
members of which are everywhere observed to lose sight of the aggregate interests of the
Community, and even to sacrifice them to the interests or prejudices of their respective constituents." Remarks on Mr.Jefferson's Draftof a Constitution, in THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER, supra
note 46, at 35. Madison's preference for large election districts, see Speech in the Virginia
Ratifying Convention (June 11, 1788), in 5 THE WRIMNGS OF JAMES MADISON 158 (G. Hunt
ed. 1904), fits well with this view. So too with his preference for length of service: "The
tendency of longer period of service would be, to render the Body more stable in its policy,
and more capable of stemming popular currents taking a wrong direction, til reason and justice could regain their ascendency." Meyers, supra, at 508.
58. This view can be found in the literature of the antifederalists, relying largely on
Montesquieu. The federalist exclusion of the citizenry from politics, see, e.g., THE FEDERALIST
No. 63, at 493 (A. Hamilton) (P. Ford ed. 1898) (referring to the "total exclusion of the
people in their collective capacity"), is stressed and deplored in R. HOFSTADTER, THE AMERiCAN PoLrcIAL TRAvrrION (1948); J. Nedelsky, supra note 42. Cf Ackerman, supra note 27
(stressing the role of citizen participation, in the federalist conception, during rare but important moments of constitutional creation).
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that would promote social welfare. 59 Instead, he aimed to ensure
against such a struggle through the mechanism of representation. The federalists rejected the notion that political actions
were inevitably self-interested: "As there is a degree of depravity
in mankind which requires a certain degree of circumspection
and distrust, so there are other qualities in human nature which
60
justify a certain portion of esteem and confidence."
This was not, however, the entire story. The structural provisions of the Constitution attempted to bring about public-spirited representation, to provide safeguards in its absence, and to
ensure an important measure of popular control. Bicameralism
thus attempted to ensure that some representatives would be relatively isolated while others would be relatively close to the people. 6 '

Indirect election of representatives played a far more

important role at the time of ratification than it does today; the
fact that state legislatures chose senators ensured that one house
of the national legislature would have additional insulation from
political pressure. The electoral college is another important example; it was to be a deliberative body standing apart from con62
stituent pressures.
Perhaps most important, the separation of powers scheme
was designed with the recognition that even national representatives may be prone to the influence of "interests" that are inconsistent with the public welfare. In The FederalistNo. 10, Madison
noted that "enlightened statesmen will not always be at the
helm."63 The Federalist No. 51, moreover, has a much different
59. See Meyers, Introduction to THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER, supra note 46, at xxiv-xxxiii; cf.
Ackerman, supra note 27 (arguing that the framers recognized pluralist bargaining as an acceptable, ordinary element of politics).
60. THE FEDERALIST No. 55, at 371 (A. Hamilton) (P. Ford ed. 1898).
61. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 62 & 63 (A. Hamilton). See also THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERA. CONVENTION OF 1787, at 422-23 (M. Farrand ed. 1911) (where Madison defends the

Senate on this ground).
62. See THE FEDERALIST No. 68, at 452 (A. Hamilton) (P. Ford ed. 1898) ("the immediate
election should be made by men most capable of analyzing the qualities adapted to the station, and acting under circumstances favorable to deliberation, and to a judicious combination of all the reasons and inducements which were proper to govern their choice").
According to Dean Ely, the increasingly "democratic" quality of American politics argues
against an expansive judicial role. SeeJ. ELY, supra note 22, at 7. From the framers' point of
view, however, the opposite inference might be drawn: Increasing responsiveness to constituent pressures and diminishing deliberation and "refinement" of the public view argue in favor
of ensuring that some part of government take a "sober second look" at political outcomes.
See note 73 infra. This perception plays a prominent role in modem public law.
63. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 58 (J. Madison) (P. Ford ed. 1898).
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emphasis from Madison's other work, relying on the celebrated
"policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of
better motives." 64 "Ambition," in the classic formulation, "must
be made to counteract ambition." 65 The system of checks and
balances within the federal structure was intended to operate as a
check against self-interested representation and factional tyranny
in the event that national officials failed to fulfill their responsibilities. If a private group were able to achieve dominance over a
certain part of the national government, or if a segment of rulers
obtained interests that diverged from those of the people, other
national officials would have both the incentive and the means to
resist.
The federal system would also act as an important safeguard.
The "different governments will control each other" and ensure
stalemate rather than action at the behest of particular private
interests. 66 The jealousy of state governments and the attachment of the citizenry to local interests would provide additional
protection against the aggrandizement of power in national
institutions.
The result is a complex system of checks: national representation, bicameralism, indirect election, distribution of powers, and
the federal-state relationship would operate in concert to
counteract the effects of faction despite the inevitability of the
factional spirit. And the Constitution itself, enforced by disinterested judges and adopted in a moment in which the factional
spirit had been perhaps temporarily extinguished, 67 would prevent both majorities and minorities from usurping government
power to distribute wealth or opportunities in their favor.
There has been no discussion thus far of the problem of private property, whose protection was a principal interest of the
framers.6 s But there is a close practical relationship between the
desire to protect private property from governmental intrusion
64. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51 at 344-45 (J. Madison) (P. Ford ed. 1898).
65. Id at 344; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 72 (A. Hamilton). For an attempt at harmonization of the Federalists Nos. 10 & 51, see G. WILLS, supra note 56, at 201-07.
66. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 346 (J. Madison) (P. Ford ed. 1898).

67. See Ackerman, supra note 27. Charles Beard and others, of course, have attributed
the content of the Constitution to self-interested motivations. For a useful collection, see
ESSAYS ON THE MAKING OF THE CONSTrrUTION (L. Levy ed. 1969).
68. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 54 (A. Hamilton) (government instituted for protection
of property). See generally C. BrARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRErATION OF THE CONsTrrTUON OF
THE UNrED STATES (1913); R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 58; Nedelsky, supra note 42. Of course,

The FederalistNo. 10 proclaims that differences in property are based on the "diversity in the
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and the devices set up by the framers to guard against the dangers posed by faction. In the framers' view, the problem of faction lay partly in the danger that a self-interested group would
obtain governmental power in order to put property rights at
risk. The various safeguards, including representation by officials who would be able to take a broader view of the relevant
issues, may be understood as having the protection of property
rights from majoritarian incursion as one of their principal purposes. 69 In this respect as well, the federalists can be contrasted
with their antifederalist opponents, whose weaker concern for
private property coexisted easily with their preference for decentralized democracy. 70 Moreover, the federalists' hospitable
view-at least in some settings-toward political stalemate and
government inaction 7 1 may be associated with a desire to protect
private property; inaction would preserve the existing distribution of wealth.
There is in this sense a close practical relationship between
the concern for private property and the Madisonian governmental structure. But the relationship is hardly one of logical necessity. It is, for example, possible to believe in the Madisonian
conception of the role of national representatives, but at the
same time to accept redistribution of resources and selection of
preferences as legitimate governmental goals. Under this view,
the representative must deliberate rather than respond mechanically to constituent pressures; but if deliberation produces a conclusion in favor of redistribution or different preferences, so be
it. This was neither the hope nor the expectation of the Federalists. But it is entirely consistent with their underlying conception
of politics and representation, and as we will see, it has significant
parallels in current constitutional law.
III.

A DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY

The picture that emerges has been aptly termed "deliberative
democracy. ' 72 The federalists rejected the view of their adversafaculties of men" and that such diversity cannot be eliminated without extinguishing freedom.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 56-57 (J. Madison) (P. Ford ed. 1898).
69. See Nedeisky, supra note 42; see also EPSTEIN, supra note 17.
70. But see Kenyon, supra note 29 (arguing that the antifederalists were not in favor of
substantial redistribution).
71. See, e.g., THE FEDERALs-T No. 22 (A. Hamilton); THE FEDERAuST No. 10 (J. Madison).

72. See Bessette, supra note 26, at 102. See also THE FEDERALIST Nos. 27, 63, 71 & 78 (A.
Hamilton) (on the theme of deliberation).
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ries on the ground that it undervalued the likelihood that local
government would be dominated by private interests instead of
profiting from civic virtue. Moreover, the federalists doubted
that the private interests of the citizenry could be subordinated
by instilling principles of civic virtue. Finally, they thought that
commercial development was crucial to the new nation and could
not be achieved without a considerable degree of centralization.
But the federalists did not believe that representatives would or
should respond mechanically to private pressure. Instead, the national representatives were to be above the fray of private interests. Above all, their task was deliberative. Indeed, the task of
the legislator was very close to the task of the citizen in the traditional republican conception.
The republican elements of the federalists' approach are captured in Hamilton's suggestion that
When occasions present themselves in which the interests of
the people are at variance with their inclinations, it is the duty
of the persons whom they have appointed to be the guardians
of those interests to withstand the temporary delusion, in order
to give them time and opportunity for more cool and sedate
reflection. 73
The notion that politics might be conducted solely as a process of bargaining and trade-offs was thus far from the federalist
understanding.7 4 The federalists' suspicion of civic virtue and
their relatively skeptical attitude toward the possibility that citizens could escape their self-interest led them to reject the traditional republican structure without rejecting important features
of its normative understanding of politics.
For the federalists, politics was to be deliberative in a special
sense. Representatives were accountable to the public; their deliberative task was not disembodied. The framers thus created
political checks designed to ensure that representatives would
73. THE FEDERALIST No. 71 at 477 (A. Hamilton) (P. Ford ed. 1898); see also THE FEDERALIST Nos. 55 & 59 (A. Hamilton); THE FEDERALIST No. 49 (J. Madison). Compare THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton)(discussingjudges). SeeJ. ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS (1979)
(on voluntary foreclosure of choices).
There is a close parallel between this conception of representation and recent justifications for the Supreme Court's role as a provider of a disinterested second look at legislation.
See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); Wellington, Common Law Rues and Con-

stitutionalDouble Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE LJ. 221 (1973). See also text
accompanying notes 215-216 infra.
74. See THE FEDERALIST No. 77, at 515 (A. Hamilton) (referring to "a scandalous bar-

tering of votes and bargaining for places") (P. Ford ed. 1898).
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not stray too far from the desires of their constituents. The result was a hybrid conception of representation, in which legislators were neither to respond blindly to constituent pressures nor
75
to undertake their deliberations in a vacuum.
The federalists thus achieved a kind of synthesis of republicanism and the emerging principles of pluralism. Politics rightly
consisted of deliberation and discussion about the public good.
But that process could not be brought about in the traditional
republican fashion; such an effort, in light of human nature,
would deteriorate into a struggle among competing factions. A
partial solution lay in principles of representation. The mechanisms of accountability would prevent representatives from acquiring interests distinct from those of their constituents.
Moreover, the separation of powers would ensure that if a particular group acquired too much power over one set of representatives, there would be safeguards to prevent that group from
obtaining authority over the national government in general.
Recent historical work has shown that the framers' understanding cannot be fully explained in either Lockean or pluralist
terms. 76 Republican thought played a critical and too often neglected role in the framers' understanding-notwithstanding
their departure from the more conventional republicanism of the
antifederalists. A significant element 77 in federalist thought was
the expectation that the constitutional system would serve republican goals better than the traditional republican solution of small
republics, civic education, and limited reliance on representatives. The federalists believed that the new scheme of representation would preserve the underlying republican model of
politics without running the risk of tyranny or relying on naive
understandings about the human capacity to escape self-interest.
I use the term "Madisonian republicanism" to refer to the result75. See H. PrrxIN, supra note 19.
76. See, e.g., J. POCOCK, supra note 7; Katz, The Origins of American ConstitutionalThought, 3
PEsp. Am. Hisr. 474 (1969); Shalhope, Toward a Republican Synthesis: The Emergence ofan Understanding of Republicanism in American Historiography, 29 WM. & MARY Q. 49 (1972). But see J.
DIGGINS, supra note 27 (challenging the republican understanding and stressing the importance of Locke); Kramnick, Republican Revisionism Revisited, 87 Am. HisT. REv. 629 (1982).
77. This is not to deny that there were Lockean and pluralist motivations as well. See
generally Tm MORAL FoUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN REutauc (R. Horwitz 2d ed. 1979). As

indicated in the text, these motivations manifested themselves in efforts to protect private
property from majoritarian intrusion and to develop surrogate safeguards in the event that
national representatives failed to act responsibly.
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ing scheme, which occupies an intermediate position between interest-group pluralism and traditional republicanism.
IV.

INTEREST GROUPS AND THE CONSTITUTION:

CURRENT DOCTRINE

A.

Was Madison Wrong?

It should hardly be controversial to suggest that Madison's
understanding of the role of the representative has been only imperfectly realized. Few would contend that nationally selected
representatives have been able to exercise the role Madison anticipated. The state of political and economic theory on this
point remains surprisingly crude. But there is mounting evidence that the pluralist understanding captures a significant component of the legislative process and that, at the descriptive level,
it is far superior to its competitors.
There are numerous theories about legislative decisionmaking. One theory suggests that a considerable amount of legislative behavior can be explained if one assumes that members of
Congress seek single-mindedly the goal of reelection. 78 Another
approach indicates that three primary considerations- achieving
influence within the legislature, promoting public policy, and obtaining reelection-have more explanatory power than any single-factored approach. 79 In the economic literature, there have
been efforts to explain legislative behavior solely by reference to
constituent pressures.8 0 Such interpretations have been attacked
as too reductionist.8 '
What emerges is a continuum. At one pole are cases in which
interest-group pressures are largely determinative and statutory
enactments can be regarded as "deals" among contending interests. At the other pole lie cases where legislators engage in deliberation in which interest-group pressures, conventionally
defined, play little or no role. At various points along the continuum a great range of legislative decisions exist where the out78. See M. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT (1977);
D. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974).
79. See R. ARNOLD, CONGRESS AND THE BUREAUCRACY: A THEORY OF INFLUENCE (1979); R.
FENNO, CONGRESSMEN IN COMMIrEES (1973). See also J. KINGDON, CONGRESSMEN'S VOTING
DECISIONS (1981).

80. See Peltzman, ConstituentInterest and CongressionalVoting, 27 J.L & ECON. 181 (1984);
Peltzman, supra note 14; Stigler, supra note 6.
81. See A. MAASS, CONGRESS AND THE COMMON GOOD (1983); Kalt & Zupan, Capture and
Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics, 74 AM. ECON. Rv. 279 (1984); Stewart, supra note 7.
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comes are dependent on an amalgam of pressure, deliberation,
and other factors. No simple test can distinguish cases falling at
different points on the continuum.
This is not an appropriate place for an evaluation of existing
theories of legislative behavior. It is clear that constituent pressures play a significant role in many legislative decisions and that
the federalist ideal of national responsibility to a national constituency does not exist in practice. We are far from Madison's deliberative democracy. Indeed, the evidence suggests that the
factional struggle that Madison sought to escape more closely
captures politics as it is generally practiced.
B.

The Judicial Response

Constitutional doctrine has not responded with equanimity to
the prevalence of pluralist politics. Indeed, it is possible to trace
much of judge-made public law directly to a concern that the
Madisonian ideal has been too sharply compromised in practice.
The core demand of the equal protection and due process
clauses, for example, is that measures taken by legislatures or administrators must be "rational." 8 2 This demand has been puzzling to those who understand the political process as a series of
unprincipled bargains among competing social groups. 83 Under
this conception of the political process, review of statutes for "rationality" is incoherent. It demands of statutory enactments
something inconsistent with their very nature as the product of
self-interested efforts by competing groups seeking scarce social
resources.
The rationality requirement may, however, be understood
precisely as a requirement that regulatory measures be something other than a response to political pressure.8 4 In the rationality cases, the Court requires some independent "public
82. Thus, for example, when a state enacts a statute banning the sale of milk in paperboard milk cartons, the government must show that the prohibition serves some public interest and is not merely the product of a successful imposition of pressure by the plastics
industry. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981). Or when a state
prevents opticians, but not ophthalmologists, from selling certain services, it must justify its
action by showing that the measure is a means of protecting consumers and not simply a
reflection of pressures imposed by ophthalmologists. See Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348
U.S. 483 (1955).
83. See Linde, Due Processof Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REv. 197 (1976); Posner, The DeFunis
Case and the Constitutionalityof Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 1.
84. See Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1689 (1984);
Sunstein, Public Values, PrivateInterests, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1982 Sup. CT. REV. 127.
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tojustify regulation. A reference to political power is,

by itself, insufficient. In no modem case has the Court recognized the legitimacy of pluralist compromise as the exclusive basis for legislation. 86 In many cases, modem and not-so-modem,
the Court has indicated that such compromise is impermissible if
87
it is the sole reason for the legislative enactment at issue.
The equal protection and due process clauses are not the only
constitutional provisions that can be understood as a repudiation
of the pluralist conception of politics. Modem contracts clause
doctrine, for example, allows the state to abrogate a contractual
obligation only if it can show that the abrogation is a means of
promoting a legitimate public value.88 The eminent domain
clause embodies a similar principle at two different stages of the
"takings" inquiry. The first is the requirement that a "public
use" be shown to justify a taking of private property;8 9 the second involves the understanding that if a statute can be fit within
the police power, it will be upheld even if no compensation has
been paid. 90
As this brief survey shows, much of modem constitutional
doctrine reflects a single perception of the underlying evil: the
distribution of resources or opportunities to one group rather
than another solely because those benefited have exercised the
85. United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 535 (1973).
86. The closest case is Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 732 (1963), where the Court
stated, "[S]tatutes create many classifications which do not deny equal protection; it is only
'invidious discrimination' which offends the Constitution." Even this statement is ambiguous,
for the label "invidious" is frequently applied to classifications based only on raw power.
To be sure, the Court has upheld statutes where the connection is at best attenuated;
whether this suggests that the Court's commitment is merely rhetorical is discussed below.
87. The indication can be found in cases demanding a "public value" justification for
statutory classifications. See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976); Daniel v.
Family Security Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220 (1949); Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141 (1940);
Rosenthal v. New York, 226 U.S. 260 (1912); Engel v. O'Malley, 219 U.S. 128 (1911); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911); Heath & Milligan Mfg. Co. v. Worst, 207
U.S. 338 (1907).
88. According to the Supreme Court, the requirement is an effort to ensure that "the
State is exercising its police power, rather than providing a benefit to special interests." Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 412 (1983) (footnote
omitted). For example, a state may abrogate a contractual obligation not as a response to
factional pressures, but to prevent an act inconsistent with a legitimate public policy-like the
commission of a crime or the passing on to consumers of increased costs. See, e.g., Exxon
Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176 (1983); Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power &
Light Co., 459 U.S. 400 (1983).
89. See, e.g., Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 464 U.S. 932 (1984).
90. See, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928)
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raw power to obtain governmental assistance. 9 1 To say this is
hardly to deny that there have been significant changes over
time, or that there are any differences among various clauses. In
the Lochner 92 era, for example, the Court prohibited not only raw
exercises of power, but also what it (wrongly) saw as the same
thing: efforts to alter the existing distribution of wealth and entitlements. Such efforts did not fall within the conventional understanding of the police power under the due process, eminent
93
domain, and contracts clauses.
The Lochner approach, rooted in solicitude for private property, 94 supplemented the prohibition of decisions based on raw
power with a conclusion that redistributive measures should be
understood in precisely the same terms, as a naked preference
for one group or individual at the expense of another. The solicitude for private property continued the original fusion of Madisonian conceptions of representation with a desire to protect
private property from redistribution at the behest of factions.
The current understanding of the police power is far broader,
encompassing a wide range of efforts to redistribute wealth or
opportunities. 9 5 The modem doctrinal framework retains the
preexisting conception of the role of national representatives but
substantially abandons the idkea that private property is entitled
to special protection from majoritarian processes. Representatives must deliberate rather than respond mechanically to constituent pressures; but decisions to redistribute resources or
opportunities, or to adapt the preexisting structure of entitlements and preferences, may well be based on an effort to promote the public good. If representatives choose to restructure
91. The privileges and immunities and dormant commerce clauses can be viewed similarly, though both provisions are directed to the narrower problem of discrimination between
citizens and non-citizens. See Sunstein, Naked Preferencesand the Constitution, supra note 84, at
1704-10, for a general discussion of the relationship among these clauses.
92. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
93. See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (due process clause); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (due process clause); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (due
process clause in the context of contractual interference); Note, The Public Use Limitation on
Eminent Domain:An Advance Requiem, 58 YAu Lj. 599 (1949) (eminent domain clause).
94. See Epstein, supra note 17;J. Nedelsky, supra note 42; text accompanying notes 68-74
supra.
95. See, e.g., Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 464 U.S. 932 (1984); Exxon Corp. v.
Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176 (1983); West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). But see
Epstein, Towards a Revitalization of the ContractClause, 51 U. Cim. L. Rxv. 703 (1984) (attempting
to reinstitute the original fusion of concerns about factions with concerns about
redistribution).
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the existing distribution of wealth, entitlements, or preferences,
their choice is usually not, for that reason, unconstitutional2 6
There have also been differences in the intensity with which
the Court has sought to enforce the prohibition of decisions
based solely on raw power. Occasionally, the Court has scrutinized the connection between legitimate ends and statutory
means to ensure that raw exercises of power are in fact "flushed
out."'9 7 At other times, the Court's approach to these issues is

highly deferential.98 In such cases, the Court has held it sufficient if a legitimate purpose can be hypothesized and if there is a
minimally plausible connection between that purpose and the
statute at issue. But the fact that there are differences in the intensity of review is not inconsistent with the claim that the
Court's basic perception of the prohibited end has remained the
same.99

The Court's perception is closely related to the Madisonian
understanding of both politics and representation. Under that
conception, as we have seen, the task of the legislator is not to
respond to private pressures but to deliberate on and to select
values. This is the basis on which Madison responded to the antifederalists and justified the scheme of representation in a large
republic. In constitutional doctrine, the judicial perception of
the prohibited end-decisions based solely on private pressureis identical to the danger that united the federalists and the antifederalists in their fears about the risks posed by faction. In constitutional doctrine as well, the government must show that
something other than private pressure accounted for its decision.
In both the federalist and the judicial accounts, representatives
are supposed to stand to some degree above the struggle of private interests, deliberating on and attempting to bring about a
common good.
The individual rights provisions are not the only area in which
this basic theme can be found. Several of the most important
separation of powers cases reflect a similar point. For example,
96. Some redistributions are, however, unconstitutional even if they are the product of a
deliberative process. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979)(physical
invasion under the takings clause).
97. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
98. See, e.g., United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980). See also
cases cited in note 87 supra.
99. See text accompanying notes 107-112 infra.
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INS v. Chadha'00 involved the constitutionality of the legislative
veto device, a mechanism by which one house of Congress could
invalidate executive action by passing a veto not subject to presidential control. In invalidating the legislative veto, the Supreme
Court emphasized the factional dangers produced by evasion of
the bicameralism and presentation requirements of Article I.101
According to the Court, those requirements were designed as
safeguards against the possibility that private groups might usurp
the governmental process in order to distribute wealth or opportunities in their favor. Another prominent separation of powers
decision, Schechter Poultry' 02-the most celebrated case employing
the nondelegation doctrine to invalidate a federal statute-involved the explicit delegation of governmental authority to private groups. The statute at issue authorized representatives of
labor and management effectively to write legislation, subject to
minimal executive or congressional supervision. 10 3 This feature
of the statute contributed heavily to its unconstitutionality.
The descriptive power of this conception of politics-that legislators have a deliberative responsibility-is quite broad. It captures a theme that pervades American constitutional law. Indeed,
that conception is the most plausible candidate we have for a unitary understanding of the sorts of conduct forbidden by the
Constitution.
A critique of this approach would point out that even if the
Court's rhetoric suggests a rejection of interest-group politics as
a legitimate basis for legislation, statutes are rarely invalidated on
that basis. 0 4 The Court is willing to hypothesize legitimate ends
even in cases in which it is highly unlikely that those ends in fact
account for legislation.' 05 Moreover, it requires only the loosest
connection between statutory means and the public value at issue. 10 6 The existing doctrinal framework ensures that most stat100. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
101. I at 940-43.
102. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).

103. See id at 521-22 n.4.
104. Some of the most prominent exceptions include City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982); United States Dep't
of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973). See also Williams v. Vermont, 105 S.Ct. 2465
(1985); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 105 S. Ct. 1676 (1985). The latter cases implicate

the special danger of protectionism raised by discrimination against out-of-staters. See Sunstein, supra note 84, at 1705-10.

105. See, e.g., United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980).
106. See, e.g., Schweicker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1981).
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utory classifications-outside the limited areas of race, gender,
alienage, and illegitimacy-survive review. The state need not
demonstrate that the value was in fact responsible for the legislative decision, even if the statute is an obvious response to factional power, and the representatives apparently did not
deliberate at all.
Under this view, the prohibition against exercises of raw
power is merely rhetorical-in reality, no prohibition at all. This
phenomenon implies that the current doctrinal framework
reveals judicial acceptance of the pluralist understanding and no
constitutional objection to interest-group politics as such. Skepticism about the existence of the prohibition might be buttressed
with the view, associated with the legal realists, 10 7 that what matters is what the courts do, not what they say; and what they do is
to uphold the outcome of pluralist struggle at almost every turn.
There is much that is persuasive in this critique. It would be
foolish to suggest that, at any time since the decline of the Lochner period, the Court has been engaged in a serious or sustained
effort to police the operation of interest-group politics. On the
other hand, it would be equally foolish to attempt to explain current law as a system in which interest-group politics is accepted
as an ordinary and permissible element of the political process.
The existing doctrinal framework differs dramatically from what
one would expect to see if the pluralist understanding were fully
accepted.
As an illustration of this point, consider the fact that after
abandoning the Lochner approach, the Court was confronted
with three principal options for doctrinal development. It could
conclude with Justice Holmes, 08 and perhaps Justice Black, 10 9
that decisions based on raw exercises of power are a legitimate
and appropriate part of politics. Such a conclusion would lead to
the elimination of rationality review altogether. The Court
would announce that political pressures are a legitimate basis for
statutory classifications and that so long as impermissible factors
(such as race) do not enter into the decision, there is no constitutional issue.
The Court's second option was to adhere to the conclusion
that decisions based on raw power are prohibited, to accept the
107. J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 22-31 (1930).
108. See Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U.S. 59 (1912).
109. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
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fact that redistribution need not be characterized as such a decision, but to continue to scrutinize the political process carefully
to ensure that legislators were responding to something other
than factional pressure. Under such an approach, Lochner-like
decisions involving redistributive statutes would be overruled if
the legislators had responded to a plausible conception of the
public good.
The third option was to continue to assert that decisions
based on raw power are prohibited, to accept redistribution as a
permissible social goal, and to adopt a highly deferential approach in examining whether a statute is in fact solely a response
to interest-group pressures. Such an approach would reflect the
same normative model of government as the second. The difference is that it would rely on considerations of the separation of
powers to create a strong presumption in favor of the legislature
against the charge that a statutory enactment is solely a reflection
of the power of private groups.
The third option is, of course, the one the Court has selected.
This option is different from the first: it results in a different
rhetoric, occasionally produces different results,1 10 creates a distinct analytic framework, and, most important, reflects a normative understanding, with strong Madisonian overtones, that is
altogether different from that which underlies the pluralist understanding. There are not, to be sure, frequent differences in
result between the first and third options, but that should not
disguise the fact that the two reflect sharply divergent conceptions of politics.
In this regard, the prohibition of decisions based on raw
power may be regarded as a member of the class of "underenforced" constitutional norms."' Such norms are binding on
government, but their judicial enforcement is limited because of
the familiar institutional concerns ofjudicial competence and authority.1 12 Whether the norm in question here should be enforced more vigorously is a matter taken up below.
110. See, e.g., Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982); United States Dep't of Agriculture v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); cf Logan v. Zinmerrnan Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
111. See generally Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced ConstitutionalNorms,
91 HARv. L. REv. 1212 (1978).
112. See id. at 1220-28.
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The Problem of "Ideology"

Large elements of constitutional law are not susceptible to explanation in the terms used thus far. The Constitution creates a
shield of "rights" on which government may not intrude even if
the legislative process is genuinely deliberative. Those rightsincluding most prominently the right to free speech-are protected regardless of the motivation of the legislature." 3 Deliberation is, in this respect, a necessary though not a sufficient
condition for validity. Independent constitutional constraints
operate to bar government action that is properly motivated
under the framework described thus far.
Another set of constraints finds its source in "heightened
scrutiny" under the equal protection clause. In cases involving
discrimination against blacks, women, aliens, and illegitimates,
the Court has invalidated statutes even when they were not raw
exercises of power in the ordinary sense. 114 For example, the
Court has struck down provisions stating that wives are automatically entitled to social security benefits, but that husbands must
show dependency. 115 Such statutes are not raw exercises of
power; they are responsive to certain (perhaps mistaken or invidious) conceptions about the nature of female participation in the
workplace. How might these developments be explained?
An intriguing possibility is suggested by the Court's own explanation of why it approaches such classifications with special
skepticism. In the area of gender, the Court has said that its
skeptical approach guarantees that the relevant classifications are
supported by "reasoned analysis" and are not the byproduct of
"traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions about the proper
roles of men and women." 116 At first glance, the notion that legislation must be the product of "reasoned analysis" seems odd.
113. The legislative motivation does, however, play a role in determining the level of
judicial scrutiny. See Stone, Content Regulation and the FirstAmendment, 25 WM. & MARY L.REV.
189 (1983). Moreover, the right to free speech may be regarded as an effort to protect the
deliberative process. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GovERNMENT (1948).

Other rights-based constraints include protection against takings of private property,
protection against interference with religious liberties, and protection against the unfair ad-

ministration of criminal justice.
114. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365 (1971); Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968).
115. See Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S.

636 (1975).
116. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 726 (1982).
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That notion may be properly applied to the courts and perhaps
to administrative agencies. 1 7 But reasoned analysis is normally
not a prerequisite of legislation.
Underlying the Court's approach is a perception that classifications in this context are likely to reflect private power, even if it
is possible to identify a public value that the relevant classification can be said to serve. When a statute discriminates against
women, there is a special likelihood that it is not an effort to promote the public good, but is instead an unthinking reflection of
existing relations of power. Discrimination against women may
result from the disproportionate authority of men over lawmaking processes or, more precisely, from an understanding about
the proper roles of men and women that itself operates to promote the power of men and to undermine the power of
women.li 8
The basic approach is largely a version of the prohibition of
decisions based on raw power, but with an important twist. Here
it is insufficient to invoke a plausible, even widely held conception of the public interest as a basis for the classification. The
public value justification must survive critical scrutiny designed
to ensure that it is not itself a product of existing relations of
power.
The "reasoned analysis" requirement is classically republican.
The role of the representative is to deliberate on the public good,
not to respond mechanically to existing social conceptions.
Under the Court's framework, such conceptions must themselves
be subjected to critical review. 119 They cannot be automatically
translated into law. The result is to apply the deliberative task to
social practices that had previously been accepted as natural and
117. See notes 128-158 infra and accompanying text.
118. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward FeministJurisprudence,8
SIGNS 635 (1983); MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agendafor Theory, 7
SIGNS 515 (1982); Pateman, Defending Prostitution." Charges Against Ericsson, 93 ETHics 561
(1983); Pateman, Women and Consent, 8 POL. THEORY 149 (1980).
119. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3259 (1985);
("[M]ere negative attitudes, or fear ... are not permissible bases for treating a home for the
mentally retarded differently. . . [The City may not avoid the strictures of [the Equal Protection] clause by deferring to the wishes or objections of some fraction of the body politic"); cf.
J. HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE COMPETENCE (1984) (discussing communicative action, in which preferences are subject to critical scrutiny, as basis for social determinations); Unger, supra note 35, at 602 (discussing "superliberalism").
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inviolate. 12 0

One of the distinctive features of this approach is that the outcome of the legislative process becomes secondary. What is important is whether it is deliberation-undistorted by private
power-that gave rise to that outcome.12 ' Some classifications
that would be unconstitutional if they were the product of an unreflective process will be upheld if they are the result of "reasoned analysis."' 22 The Court's willingness to scrutinize public
value justifications to determine whether they are in fact a disguise for, or rooted in, private power is a crude use of the concept of "ideology" as a basis for review of legislation. 23
There are considerable difficulties in using a conception of
ideology as the basis for analysis of equal protection problems.
Courts are ill-equipped for the task of deciding whether particular values in fact reflect relations of power. In the abstract, there
may be no reason to believe that the courts are more insulated
from the effects of ideology than other governmental institutions.
Moreover, there are formidable difficulties in the view that something called "reasoned analysis" might be used by human actors
to expose certain values as the product of private power.' 24 I re120. See R. UNGER, PASSION 7-15 (1984) (discussing "modernist thesis" that existing
practices should be subject to critical scrutiny).
121. Some classifications, of course, will not be upheld even if they come about after
lengthy periods of deliberation by legislators. There is a judicial perception that certain
measures are inevitably "distorted"--the product of private power-notwithstanding the fact
of lengthy discussion. One might distinguish between classifications that might be, but are
not, the product of deliberation, see note 122 infra, and classifications that are inevitably the
product of power even if there has been actual discussion of their costs and benefits. This
latter possibility of course makes the distinction between "procedural" and "substantive" review quite thin. (I am indebted to Donald Regan for helping to clarify my thoughts on this
point.)
122. The gender cases illustrate this point most dearly. In Califano v. Goldfarb, 430
U.S. 199 (1977), the Court indicated that if the statutory discrimination against women workers had been the product of a detailed inquiry into the facts, it might have been upheld. In
Heckler v. Mathews, 104 S.Ct. 1387, 1398 (1984), the Court upheld a statute designed to
protect reliance interests under the statute invalidated in Goldfarb. The Court concluded that
the latter statute, unlike the former, was impermissibly motivated. In Califano v. Webster, 430
U.S. 313, 317 (1977), the Court upheld discrimination in the calculation of social security
benefits on the ground that the legislative history showed that the classification was an effort
to compensate for past discrimination against women.
123. See J. ELSTER, supra note 11; M. FOUCAuLT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE (C. Gordon ed.
1980); R. GEuss, THE IDEA OF A CRrrICAL THEORY (1981); J. HABERmAS, KNOWLEDGE AND
HuMAN ITREsTs (1971).
124. See, e.g., M. FOUCAULT, DxscipuuN AND PuN SH 27-28 (1979); M. FOUcAuLT, HisTORY OF SxuAuTr 85-91 (1980);J. KEANE, PUMLIC IaFE AND LATE C.APTArSM 168-72 (1984);

Lukes, Of Gods and Demons: Haberrasand PracticalReason, in HABERMAS: CRm-TcAL DEBATES 134
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turn to these issues below.1 25 For the moment, it is sufficient to
suggest that modem constitutional doctrine recognizes that
some values are in fact the product of power.
It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that a commitment to counteracting the effects of "ideology" is a consistent or
dominant theme in the cases. The requirement of "reasoned
analysis" is applied in a relatively small category of cases involving discrimination on the basis of race, gender, alienage, and illegitimacy. 126 Elsewhere, the Court is much more deferential. In
the most prominent example, the Court has refused to invalidate
legislation involving stereotypical (and unreflective) conceptions
27
about the poor.'
What emerges is a jurisprudence that inspects legislation to
determine whether representatives have attempted to act deliberatively, but there are sharp divergences in the nature and extent
of the judicial inquiry. In general, the Court is extraordinarily
deferential, adopting a strong presumption in favor of the legislation. Scrutiny is heightened only in narrow circumstances in
which public value justifications are subject to critical inspection.
But in both contexts, the underlying conception of representation is Madisonian, and the normative understanding of politics
is republican.
V.

FACTIONS

AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

Thus far, the focus has been on constitutional law-doctrines
rooted in the equal protection, due process, eminent domain,
and contract clauses-insofar as they reflect a particular understanding of the prohibited end. In the area of administrative law,
where the basic doctrines are nonconstitutional in status, there
are similar themes.
At one level, this should be expected. Since the early growth
(J. THOMPSON & B. HELD eds. 1982). The notion of practical reason as a device for attacking
ideology is, however, enjoying a resurgence in some circles. See R. BERNSrEIN, supra note 7, at
182-223; J. HABERMAS, supra note 123; A. MAclrrvaE, supra note 7. Recent feminist writing

provides a particularly useful model for understanding the relationship between knowledge
and power. See A.JAGGER, FmimST PoLrrxcs AND HUMAN NATURE (1983); Held, Feminism and

Epistemology: Recent Work on The ConnectionBetween Gender and Knowledge, 14 PHIL. & PuB. AFF.
296 (1985); Pateman, Defending Prostitution,supra note 118.
125. See text accompanying notes 207-238 infra.
126. See notes 114-123 supra.
127. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471 (1970).
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of administrative agencies, the problem of faction has been a central concern. 128 The original separation of powers scheme was
intended to combat that problem with the safeguards of electoral
accountability and separated powers. The creation of administrative agencies breached both of those safeguards. Agency functions do not fall easily into the conventional categories of
legislation, administration, and execution; often they combine all
three. More fundamentally, administrative agencies exercise
broad discretionary power with only intermittent control from
the electorally accountable branches of the federal government. 129 The danger is that private groups will co-opt the administrative process and exploit it to their advantage.
The initial response of the courts was predictable: they invalidated the delegation of lawmaking authority to administrative
agencies.' 30 As noted above, Schechter Poultry involved a delegation of legislative power to private groups,' 3 ' who were effectively authorized to make law with only minimal supervision from
Congress or the President. For various reasons, 3 2 the strategy
of invalidation on constitutional grounds was ultimately abandoned. 133 After the abandonment, administrative law consisted
largely of an effort to require clear authorization for government
intrusions into the realm of private property. 34 This approach
paralleled developments in constitutional law that used the
touchstone of private property as the basis for judicial intervention. 35 But here-as in the constitutional area, and for the same
reasons13 6 -the touchstone of property is no longer a plausible
basis for judicial review. Much of modem administrative law is a
means of serving the original purposes of the nondelegation doctrine, and of promoting Madisonian goals, without invalidating
128. See generally note 3 supra.
129. See R. LrrAN & W. NoiRHAus, REFORMING FEDERAL REGULATION (1983).
130. See Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refining
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
131. See Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). See generallyJaffe,
Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARv. L. REv. 201 (1937).
132. See generally Stewart, supra note 3.
133. See, e.g., Mourning v. Family Publications Services, Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973); Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971) (three-judge district
court). There have, however, been some rumblings in the Court in the other direction. See,
e.g., Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 671 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
134. SeeJ. VINING, LEGAL IDENTrrY 20-27 (1978); Stewart, supra note 3.
135. See text accompanying notes 91-94 supra.
136. See notes 87-90 supra and accompanying text.
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regulatory statutes or relying on traditional conceptions of private property.137

The most important doctrinal innovation in administrative
law, for example, is the "hard-look doctrine."138 In its current
incarnation, the doctrine contains four principal features. Agencies must give detailed explanations for their decisions;1 39 justify
departures from past practices; 140 allow participation in the regulatory process by a wide range of affected groups;' 4 ' and consider
42
reasonable alternatives, explaining why they were rejected.'
Courts will also scrutinize the decision on the merits.' 4 These
devices may be understood as a form of means-ends scrutiny akin
to what we have seen in constitutional law. The courts examine
the connection between statutorily relevant ends and the means
chosen by the agency to promote those ends. If the connection is
sufficiently attenuated, impermissible bases for regulatory action
can be "flushed out." These bases may be impermissible because they are not relevant under the governing statute44 or because they are solely the product of political pressures.
The hard-look doctrine has significantly transformed administrative decisionmaking, particularly in notice-and-comment
137. SeeJ. VINING, supra note 134 at 29-33, 179-81; Stewart & Sunstein, Public Programs
and Piivate Rights, 95 HnAv. L. REv. 1193, 1232-39, 1278-79, 1317-18 (1982).
138. Originally created by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, the "hard-look
doctrine" is now the generally accepted framework for reviewing the work of administrative
agencies. See Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971); Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the
Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 509 (1974).
139. See, e.g., Brae Corp. v. United States, 740 F.2d 1023, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Office
of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413, 1425 (D.C. Cir. 1983);
NAACP v. FCC, 682 F.2d 993, 997 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
140. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 103 S. Ct. 2856,
2865-66 (1983); Community Nutrition Inst. v. Block, 749 F.2d 50, 54 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Public
Citizen v. Sneed, 733 F.2d 93, 100 (D.C. Cir. 1984); National Tour Brokers Assn. v. ICC, 671

F.2d 528, 532 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
141. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 523-525 (1978)
(holding that such participation requirements must be grounded in the Administrative Procedure Act); NAACP v. FCC, 682 F.2d 993, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1982); National Welfare Rights Org.
v. Finch, 429 F.2d 725, 739 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Notwithstanding Vermont Yankee, the APA's

provisions for judicial review have generated record requirements that may in turn produce
participation. See Stewart, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative Procedure,91 HAnv.

L. REv. 1805, 1809 (1978).
142. See State Farm, 103 S.Ct. at 2869-2870; Walter 0. Boswell Memorial Hosp. v.
Heckler, 749 F.2d 788, 797 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Brae Corp. v. United States, 740 F.2d 1023,
1039 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
143. See, e.g., State Farm, 103 S.Ct. at 2871-74.
144. See Garland, Deregulation andJudicialReview, 98 HARv.L. REv. 507 (1985).
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rulemaking. The drafters of the Administrative Procedure Act 45
intended informal rulemaking to resemble legislation. The process would be an open-ended one in which officials would be free
to consult all affected interests. No detailed explanation of
agency outcomes would be required; a "concise statement of basis and purpose"'146 would suffice. Administrative rulemaking, in
short, was to be "political" in character, in the sense that officials
would base decisions not on conventional processes of reasoning, but on responses to constituent desires and on informally
obtained information about issues of fact and policy. In this respect, administrative rulemaking lay at the opposite pole from
agency adjudication, which was surrounded by the ordinary trappings of the judicial process. 147
In these circumstances, the various judicial innovations reflected in the "hard-look doctrine" seem quite odd. By applying
many of the safeguards of adjudication to the rulemaking process, those innovations transform notice-and-comment rulemaking into something very different from ordinary legislation.
A revealing development in this regard involves "ex parte contacts" in rulemaking. Such contacts are defined as off-the-record
communications between government officials and private parties potentially affected by their decisions. In the most celebrated case involving such contacts, commissioners of the
Federal Communications Commission were alleged to have spoken off-the-record with network officials about regulatory proposals. 148 The legal question was whether the Administrative
Procedure Act bars such communications, or at least requires
that they be put in the administrative file or be disclosed to the
public.
Under the original understanding of rulemaking, there was
no prohibition of ex parte contacts, and public disclosure was not
required. This result was a natural outgrowth of the legislative
model of administration. Legislators are not discouraged from
145. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1982).
146. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c)(1982); see also South Carolina ex reL Tindal v. Block, 717 F.2d
874, 886 (4th Cir. 1983); Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722, 739 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
147. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556 (1982).
148. See Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829
(1977). See also Iowa State Commerce Comm'n v. Office of Fed. Inspector, 730 F.2d 1566,
1576-77 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 400-10 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
United States Lines, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 584 F.2d 519, 541-43 (D.C. Cir.
1978); Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458, 468-74 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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communicating informally with affected citizens about proposed
measures. On the contrary, informal communications are affirmatively encouraged because they facilitate the process of obtaining information about the nature and extent of constituent
desires. Similarly, administrators deciding on proposed rules
were not to be precluded from consulting informally with all interested parties. 149 Such consultation would hardly impair the legitimacy of the administrative process; indeed it would promote
it.
Recent judicial efforts to require disclosure of exparte contacts
stem from an altogether different conception of administration.
That conception departs from the original legislative understanding based on constituent pressure in favor of a more deliberative role for administrators. 150 The new conception reflects a
belief that the pluralist understanding of administration threatens to subvert statutory goals by reflecting private whim. 15 1
What do the courts-and to some degree Congress 152 and administrative agencies' 53-hope to accomplish with these procedural safeguards? The answer should be familiar. Reviewing
courts are attempting to ensure that the agency has not merely
responded to political pressure but that it is instead deliberating
in order to identify and implement the public values that should
control the controversy. 154 A principal concern is that without
the procedural and substantive requirements of the hard-look
doctrine, the governing values may be subverted in the enforcement process through the domination of powerful private
groups.
Those values may be found in the statute, which must of
course be taken as authoritative. If, as is often the case, the statute is ambiguous, the values must be ascertained by the agency
through a more open-ended process. In this process, the agency
must ensure public scrutiny and review and thereby guard
against outcomes imposed by dominant factions. The hard-look
doctrine, in its examination of the relationship between regula149. See Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1979 Sup.
CT. REv. 345.
150. See State Farm, 103 S. Ct. 2856 (1983).
151. See id.
152. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982) (Clean Air Act).
153. Many agencies have voluntarily adopted procedural safeguards of this sort.
154. See Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-Look Doctrine, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 177.
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tory means and legitimate public ends, is a method of facilitating
this process.
Accompanying this idea is a judicial attempt to discipline the
administrative process with contemporary principles of "comprehensive rationality." 155 This approach requires explicit identification of goals 5 6 and careful exploration of the ways in which
those goals might be achieved. It aims to ensure that agency decisions will be based on statutorily permissible factors, and are
neither blindly responsive to political pressures nor based on irrelevant considerations. "Comprehensive rationality" is typically
associated with a belief in a more or less objective public interest
and with skepticism toward the idea that the purpose of politics is
57
simply to mediate a struggle among contending social groups.
Not surprisingly, critics of this judicial role have based their critique on a perception that agency decisions ought to be understood as products of pluralist politics. 5 8 This perception is a
recent incarnation of the notion that democratic outcomes are
those reached by officials who respond to constituent pressures.
VI.

ADMINISTRATIVE AND CONSTITIONAL STANDARDS:

A REPRISE

Most of these developments in contemporary administrative
law have occurred without constitutional compulsion. They must
be understood either as a species of statutory interpretation-of
the Administrative Procedure Act and of governing substantive
155. See Diver, PolicymakingParadigmsin AdministrativeLaw, 95 HAxv. L. REv. 393, 394-95
(1981).
156. Contemporary "policy science" often considers ends exogenous. See Tribe, Policy
Science: Analysis or Ideology?, 2 PHIL. & Ptm. AFt.66 (1973). That is not true in contemporary
administrative law; ends as well as means have to bejustified, either because of their connecdon with the statutory scheme or, in the absence of statutory guidance, because of their connection with public preferences. Cf J. HABERMAS, supra note 119 (discussing the justification
of values).
157. This is a prominent theme in American administrative law. In a different incarnation, similar conclusions were based on the hope that official experts might be able to discern
the public interest in a nonpartisan fashion. See J. LANDiS, THE ADMImISTRATIvE PROCESS
(1938); see also Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1276,
1286-92 (1984).
158. See Chevron, .U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resource Defense Council, Inc., 104 S. Ct.
2778, 2793 (1984); Scalia, Separation of Functions: Obscurity Preserved, 34 AD. L. REv. v (1982)
(Chairman's message); Shapiro, On Predictingthe Future ofAdministrative Law, 6 REG. 18, 20-21
(1982); Scalia, Two Wrongs Make a Right: TheJudicializationof StandardlessRulemaking, 1 REG. 38
(1977).
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statutes-or as federal common law. 159 But the developments
are strikingly similar in both form and ultimate aim to developments under equal protection review. In that context, courts
have imposed requirements on the legislative process that encourage a kind of reasoned decisionmaking that is inconsistent
with pluralist premises. Recall that "reasoned analysis" is the
Court's own description of its basic requirement in the Mississippi
University case. 160 In numerous other cases, the Court has
employed the same basic devices found in the administrative
context-means-ends scrutiny, examination of alternatives, facilitation of participation-to help ensure that legislation is not
merely a response to pressure.
In both administrative and constitutional law, judge-made
doctrines, applicable to legislators and bureaucrats, are designed
to ensure against the dangers of faction. In both areas, the
means of achieving this goal have been two-fold. The first involves scrutiny of the system of representation. If particular
groups have been excluded from the decisionmaking process, judicial deference is reduced; either participation must be afforded 16 1 or the decision on the merits must be reviewed with
care.162 The second method requires detailed explanations, in
either the legislative history or the administrative justification, to
persuade the court that the relevant officials engaged in a genuine attempt to discern the public interest.
There is, however, a significant difference between the administrative and constitutional doctrines. In administrative law, the
various requirements are imposed with considerably more rigor.
This phenomenon is probably best explained as a product of
conventional understandings of the separation of powers. The
underlying idea is that in reviewing legislative action, especially
when the relevant questions concern the motivations for such action, courts ought to give legislators the benefit of every doubt.
Before invalidating a statute, they should require overwhelming
159. But see Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. National Resource Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 547-48 (1978) (suggesting that administrative law must be traceable to

authoritative statutes). See generally Stewart, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative
Procedure, 91 HAsv. L. REv. 1805 (1978).
160. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
161. See, e.g., Union of Concerned Scientists v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 734 F.2d
1437, 1446 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584,
594 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
162. In the constititutional area, see United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152 n.4 (1938).

HeinOnline -- 38 Stan. L. Rev. 65 1985-1986

STANFORD LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 38:29

evidence that the measure in question is in fact a pure response
to political power. The rationale for deference applies with much
less force to actions of administrative agencies, whose constitutional pedigree is far less clear. 163 The constitutional status of
administrative agencies has been uncertain precisely because
they evade the ordinary constitutional safeguards against domination by powerful private groups. Congress is, of course, subject to structural safeguards, even if, as we have seen, they are at
best an imperfect guaranty. 164
The Court's deferential approach in constitutional law might
also reflect judicial ambivalence about the notion that pluralist
compromise is impermissible in the legislative realm. The difficulties in filtering out naked wealth transfers-even in cases in
which legislation is plausibly understood as a purely private
deal' 65-are formidable. Such an inquiry requires the courts to
look behind the statute and its history and effectively to supervise
the functioning of the legislative process. The courts' almost
universal 166 unwillingness to undertake that inquiry reflects not
only separation of powers concerns, but also skepticism toward
the view that the Constitution forbids legislation that is based on
the power of self-interested private groups.
These considerations lead to a more general point. Concerns
about institutional legitimacy often receive their doctrinal form
in judicial requirements of participation and reasoned explanations. When the institution's pedigree is dear, no such require163. For a time, agency decisions were treated with the same respect as legislative enactments. Now, it is clear that less deference is applied, both because of constitutional principles
and because of the Administrative Procedure Act. See Sunstein, In Defense of the Hard Look:
JudicialActivism andAdministrativeLaw, 7 HARv.J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 51 (1984). The uneasy constitutional position of administrative agencies is reflected in the statutes mandating judicial review of agency action. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1982). For a discussion of the
APA drafters' attitude toward judicial review, see Sunstein, supra note 154, at 198-200.
164. Rationality review is applied to administrators as well as to legislators; but the existence of more searching judicial scrutiny under the Administrative Procedure Act has made
rationality review superfluous. See text accompanying notes 182-184 infra (discussing the possibility that legislation may amount to the delegation of public power to private groups).
Compare in this regard the cases implementing the state action exemption to the Sherman Act. Delegation of price-fixing authority to private actors is unlawful, see Schwegmann
Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1950), but a decision to set up a regulatory
scheme that operates as an alternative to the marketplace is permissible if there is continuing
government supervision of the private conduct. See, e.g., Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States 105 S. Ct. 1721 (1985).
165. See United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980).
166. Most of the exceptions involve "heightened scrutiny." See text accompanying note
114 supra.
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ments are imposed. This has significant implications for the
universally drawn distinction 167 between due process requirements of participation in "legislative" decisions and those in "adjudicative" decisions. In the legislative context, no participation
need be afforded as a matter of constitutional right. The
processes of representation are a sufficient guaranty of legitimacy,' 68 in the sense that representation will ensure adequate responsiveness to the public at large. By contrast, in adjudicative
proceedings-when a single person or small group is singled out
for special treatment-participation is required. When a personal or narrowly held interest is at stake, the processes of representation are unlikely to be of sufficient help. Hence the rule,
fundamental to administrative law, that the due process clause
69
requires a right to participate only in adjudicative proceedings.
In recent years, there have been inroads on this traditional
dichotomy. In American public law, these inroads have occurred
on three fronts. Some courts have interpreted regulatory statutes to create rights to participate and receive an explanation in
legislative-type proceedings. 170 In other cases, courts have suggested that the Constitution independently requires that participation and explanation be available in administrative rulemaking
proceedings.' 7' Finally, a few courts have suggested that in certain situations, the Constitution requires that legislatures also respect these rights.' 72
167. Compare Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441
(1915) with Londoner v. City of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
168. To some degree, the distinction turns on the nature of the issues. Where the disputed questions turn on issues of policy, forensic factfinding devices may be less useful. See I
K. DAvis, ADMI STusmrW LAw Tt_ AnSE § 7.02 (1958).
169. See id.
170. See notes 141, 161 supra.
171. See Burr v. New Rochelle Municipal Hous. Auth., 479 F.2d 1165 (2d Cir. 1973).
172. A revealing development in this connection involves general requirements of deliberation or electoral accountability in cases concerning intrusions on constitutionally sensitive
interests. In Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976), the Court invalidated a civil
service regulation that barred noncitizens from working in the civil service. According to the
Court, concerns involving foreign affairs were not the legitimate province of the civil service
commission; such concerns could not, therefore, be invoked in support of the regulation.
Concerns involving the efficiency of the service are within the domain of the commission, but
there was no evidence of deliberation on the part of the commission to the effect that efficiency concerns justified an across-the-board ban on employment of aliens. The regulation
was therefore invalidated. The basic notion is that deliberative processes are a necessary surrogate for broad representation; when the latter is absent, the former is required.
The same notion is at work in opinions conduding that only proper decisionmakers, susceptible to special electoral control or reflecting broad deliberation, may undertake "affirma-
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In all of these areas, procedural rights are created because of
a perception that the existing processes of representation are an
inadequate guaranty that the outcome will be something other
than the result of private whim. Especially in the administrative
context, but elsewhere as well, these developments reflect a perception that traditional "political" decisions, based on constituent pressures, are likely to mask undue influence over
government processes by powerful private groups. In all of these
areas, the governing conception of politics is Madisonian: the
representative must seek a public good that is distinct from the
struggle of private interests. Judicially-created rights to participate and to receive an explanation are designed to help bring
about that result.
VII.

REVIVING MADISONIAN REPUBLICANISM

The judicial initiatives explored thus far are best understood
as evidence of a mounting distrust of pluralism and a growing
preference for a scheme that borrows from the Madisonian understanding of representation. Acceptance of the Madisonian
conception of politics, however, does not necessarily imply that
the courts ought to play a role in moving the political process in
Madisonian directions. It is highly unlikely that the courts, acting
by themselves, could accomplish a great deal in bringing the
1 73
political process closer to the Madisonian conception.
Changes in the nature of politics will depend far more on the
practices of legislative and administrative actors. Moreover, the
familiar considerations of judicial authority and competence
might counsel against an aggressive judicial role. 74
But if courts took the Madisonian conception seriously, legal
doctrine would be significantly modified, even though the foundations for these modifications exist in current law. This section
outlines the direction in which legal doctrine might shift if the
principles of Madisonian republicanism were used aggressively as
a basis for reviewing legislative and administrative action.
tive action." See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); see also New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 597
(1979) (White, J., dissenting) (emphasizing the absence of deliberation and electoral safeguards in prohibiting the hiring of methadone users).
173. Cf D. HoRowrrz, THE COURTS AND SocIAL PoLicY (1977) (discussing institutional
weaknesses of courts in bringing about social changes); J. KEANE, supra note 124 (discussing
changes necessary to bring about reinvigorated public life).
174. See text accompanying notes 204-207 infra.
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A. Proposals
1. Strengthened rationality review.
The first change that a Madisonian approach to judicial review would cause is that courts would enforce more stringently
the rationality requirement of the equal protection, due process,
contract, and eminent domain clauses. The strengthened review
would not, however, prohibit the category of impermissible ends
identified during the Lochner period. 175 Instead it would involve
review to ensure that disparate treatment is justified by reference
to something other than an exercise of political power by those
benefited-or, to state the matter positively, to ensure that representatives have exercised some form of judgment instead of re76
sponding mechanically to interest-group pressures.'
Under this strengthened system of review, two aspects of current law would be altered. First, courts would not be as willing to
hypothesize legitimate legislative purposes. They would require
some reason to believe that the legitimate purpose actually
played a part in the legislative judgment. Second, courts would
require a closer fit between statutory means and legitimate ends.
The existence of a merely plausible connection would be
insufficient. 177
As an example, consider United States RailroadRetirement Board
v. Fritz.178 At issue there was a statute designed to improve the
financial condition of the railroad retirement system-an analogue of social security-by eliminating certain benefits. Most of
those whose rights had "vested" were unaffected by the statute.
175. See text accompanying notes 91-93 supra; Sunstein, Naked Preferences, supra note 84.

176. As noted above, there is a continuum between these two poles, both representing
caricatures of a complex reality. See text accompanying notes 81-82 supra. The strengthened
rationality review would be designed to ensure against outcomes approaching the latter end
of the pole.
177. Under heightened scrutiny both of these changes from rationality review have been
made. Individual justices occasionally suggest that rationality review should be modified
along these lines. See Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 242-45 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting); United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 183-98 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 341-44 (1980) (Marshall,J., dissenting). "Heightened" means-ends scrutiny was advocated more than a decade ago in Gunther, Foreword In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a ChangingCourt: A Modelfor a Newer EqualProtection, 86 HARv. L.
REv. 1, 20-48 (1972), but without a conception of the underlying prohibited end. See also City
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985) (purporting to apply rationality review, the Court invalidated a dassification disadvantaging the mentally retarded; the
standard of review was in fact "heightened").
178. 449 U.S. 166 (1980).
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The principal disadvantaged group consisted of those permanently insured as of 1974-the date of the changeover from the
old to the new system-but deprived of benefits because they had
left the railroad industry before 1974, had no current connection
with it at the end of 1974, and had fewer than 25 years of railroad
service. The benefits of other groups-including those with a
current connection in 1974 but with less than five years of total
service-were unaffected. The statutory distinction was attacked
on equal protection grounds.
The Court upheld the classification on the ground that "equitable considerations" justified the discrimination. Those considerations included rewarding people who were likely to pursue
full careers in the railroad industry and protecting people who
were still in railroad employment when they became eligible for
benefits. Therefore the statute was "rational." The Court concluded that it was constitutionally irrelevant whether this reasoning in fact underlay the congressional decision.' 79
As it turned out, this last suggestion was critical, for the legislative history suggested a very different story from the equitable
considerations invoked by the Court. All of the available evidence indicated that members of Congress believed that no
group of beneficiaries would be harmed by the statute; indeed,
Congress intended to protect the reliance interests of all employees. There are frequent statements to this effect in the history
that were unrebutted by the government. The statute in fact had
been drafted by private groups-representatives of labor and
management-none of whom had an interest in protecting the
plaintiffs, former railroad employees, from loss of their benefits.
Hence the conclusion of the district court: "Essentially, the railroad labor negotiators traded off the plaintiff class of beneficiaries to achieve added benefits for their current employees,
even though doing so violated the basic Congressional purposes
of the negotiations."18 0
Thus understood, the case has a surprising analogue in

Schechter Poultry. 8 1 In both cases, the problem lay in the delega-

tion of public power to private groups who were authorized to
draft legislation subject to little or no congressional review.
179. Id. at 179.
180. Id. at 191 (Brennan,J., dissenting) (quoting the unpublished opinion of the district
court).
181. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
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Why, then, did only two justices vote to invalidate the legislation
at issue in Fritz? The answer probably lies in a perception that
legislation of that sort is common in modem regulation and that
a decision to subject it to serious constitutional review would unduly increase judicial scrutiny of the legislative process. Inadvertent legislative classifications may be frequent, at least if
inadvertence is measured by reference to the understanding of
most legislators. 182 Moreover, private groups often have an important role in drafting statutes. 183 If this role renders statutes
suspect, the consequence might be an extremely intrusive judicial
role, notwithstanding the conventional understanding that delegations of government power to private groups are constitution84
ally troublesome.
If the Madisonian understanding implicit in the rationality
cases is to be taken seriously, however, the Court was wrong in its
apparent belief that invalidation of the statute in Fritz would have
led to intolerable consequences. At issue was a statute that had
been drafted by private parties, who sought to protect their own
interests, or those of their allies, and of no one else. As a result,
a group not represented in the private negotiations was significandy harmed. Most important, Congress was unaware of that
harm and indeed had sought to prevent it. Fritz is a striking example of a kind of Madisonian nightmare: national legislators
abdicating their obligations because of pressure applied by powerful private groups.' 8 5 In vindicating the Madisonian understanding, cases like Fritz provide an opportunity for a modest first
step.' 86
This conclusion might be generalized. If courts were to adopt
182. See, e.g., H. Fox & S. HAMMoND, CONGRESSIONAL STAFFS: THE INVISIBLE FORCE IN

(1977) (emphasizing that drafting and other functions are performed by stall).
183. See, e.g., K. KoFMEr1L, PROFESSIONAL STAFFS OF CONGRESS 117-18 (1977) (at "various stages in the process of drafting and revising a bill, committee aides often negotiated at
the staff level with respresentatives of the affected agencies and or interest groups to remove
their objections to it"); H. WALKER, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 113 (1948) (discussing "lobbydrafted bills").
184. SeeJaffe, supra note 131.
185. See R. Stewart, The Logic of Federalism (unpublished manuscript 1984).
186. In this regard, Fritz might be compared with Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413
U.S. 528 (1973), where the Court invalidated an exclusion of "non-related individuals" from
the food stamp program on the theory that the exclusion reflects "a bare. . . desire to harm a
politically unpopular group." 413 U.S. at 534. For other cases involving statutes that might
be invalidated on rationality grounds, see, e.g., Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1981);
New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
AmERICAN LAWMAxING 143

HeinOnline -- 38 Stan. L. Rev. 71 1985-1986

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:29

a Madisonian approach to judicial review, and if the rationality
requirement is not to become merely rhetorical, some scrutiny of
legislative processes is necessary. Such scrutiny would inquire
into whether legislators based disparate treatment on a decision
that some conception of the public interest would be promoted,
or whether such treatment was instead a response to factional
pressure. To be sure, these alternatives represent polar ends of a
continuum; the question for the courts is whether the measure at
issue approaches the latter end. This approach would amount to
a kind of hard-look doctrine for unconstitutional legislative action. Its basic elements are already furnished by modern rationality review; the approach suggested here would call for
marginally more searching scrutiny.' 8 7
2.

Equalprotection, ideology, and reasoned analysis.

The second element in a reformulated public law doctrine
would be the application of the approach of Mississippi University 18 and similar gender cases to other areas of the law. As
noted above, in Mississippi University the Court showed a willingness to examine public value justifications to see whether such
justifications were in fact rooted in, or were merely a disguise for,
existing relations of power. Exploration of the legal and institutional treatment of women 8 9 is a carefully developed model
here; it may be possible to generalize these insights.
A useful illustration is the much-discussed case of Dandridgev.
Williams.' 90 At issue in Dandridgewas a Maryland statute that imposed a ceiling on benefits poor families could receive under the
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, no
matter how large that family might be. The statute was defended
largely on the ground that it provided an incentive for employment and achieved parity between those on welfare and those
working at or near the minimum wage. The problem with the
first of these justifications is that very few of the eligible families
contained anyone who was employable-i 16 families of the
187. Resistance to such a proposal is based on a particular conception of the separation
of powers-it is illegitimate for courts to examine legislative processes with even minimal
care, on the grounds that such an examination strains judicial capacities and, further, is inconsistent with the interest-group character of most modem legislation. Such arguments are
taken up below. See text accompanying notes 202-237 infra.
188. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
189. See note 124 supra.
190. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
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32,000 receiving AFDC. 191 Moreover, there was no showing that
the Maryland statute promoted in any way the goal of achieving
wage parity.
Quite possibly, the statute reflected stereotypical conceptions
about the poor in general and poor women in particular: that
their poverty is a product of sloth, and they breed children to
increase their welfare payments. It is unlikely that these justifications could have survived the "reasoned analysis" demanded in
Mississippi University. If that demand had been taken seriously, the
Maryland statute might well have been invalidated.
This conclusion might be converted into a general approach
to cases involving the poor and other contexts-involving, for example, the mentally retarded 192 and homosexuals-in which it
seems likely that legislative outcomes will reflect existing relations of power. Under such an approach, judicial scrutiny would
not reflect a Lochner-like presumption in favor of private ordering or a general effort to protect private property from government intrusion. The diminishing judicial solicitude for private
property is largely attributable to a mounting understanding that
private property rights are not "natural" but are themselves dependent on governmental as well as individual choices.' 93 Scrutiny of the relationship between statutory outcomes and private
power would generalize this insight, subjecting such outcomes to
public scrutiny and review. Taken to its logical extreme, this approach would require review of failure to act as well as action; a
refusal to reassess the existing distribution of wealth and opportunities can, of course, be understood as a product of factional
power.
As the Lochner era suggests, there are substantial difficulties
with such a judicial role. Those difficulties are taken up below.
But if Mississippi University were taken seriously, statutes like those
in Dandridgewould receive more probing scrutiny.
191. See idi at 526 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The notion of "employability" is of course

not scientifically ascertainable; it depends on a series of value judgments about under what
circumstances should people be required to work. The figure cited in the text represents the
standards set for the AFDC program.
192. See City of Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3249 (purporting not to apply "heightened scrutiny" but invalidating a statute disadvantaging the mentally retarded, applying more than the
usual level of review.)
193. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Miller v. Schoene, 276
U.S. 272 (1928). For discussion, see Kennedy, Form and Substance in PrivateLaw Adjudication, 89
HARv. L. REv. 1685 (1976); Hale, Coercion and Distributionin a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38
POL. Sci. Q, 470 (1923).
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The continuing development of public administrativelaw.

Administrative law has undergone considerable evolution
since its original preoccupation with the protection of private autonomy from government intrusion. 194 A more complete implementation of the Madisonian understanding would require
courts to build on the present trends. Courts have begun to develop a set of principles that amount to a public law that is independent of private law doctrines.195 The next step is for courts
to continue the development of substantive and procedural devices designed to ensure against factional tyranny in the implementation process. Such devices would include general
application and extension of the four basic requirements of the
current hard-look doctrine-to require, for example, disclosure
of at least some exparte contacts in informal rulemaking. The basic goal would be to ensure that agency outcomes reflect some
form of deliberation on the part of agency officials. The deliberative process should in turn involve statutorily relevant factors.
Equally important, courts should recognize that the availability and extent ofjudicial scrutiny should not depend on whether
the agency is regulating, deregulating, or not acting at all.
Courts should not treat deregulation substantially differently
from regulation. 196 There is also a trend in the direction ofjudicial review of agency inaction. 197
This trend of reviewing inaction owes its origin to two perceptions. The first is that administrative inaction is often produced by the capture of governmental power by well-organized
groups-often the very industry the relevant agency is entrusted
194. SeeJ. VINING, supra note 134; Stewart, supra note 3.
195. See Sunstein, supra note 154.
196. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 291. The only difference is that deregulation involves a
reduction of private costs, a factor that is properly taken into account by the relevant agency.
See Sunstein, supra note 154.
197. In Heckler v. Chaney, 105 S. Ct. 1649 (1985), the Court endorsed a "presumption"
against review of inaction, but the presumption is easily rebutted. See Dunlop v. Bachowski,
421 U.S. 560 (1975) (cited with approval in Chaney, 105 S. Ct. at 1657). The Chaney decision
should not be taken as a general rejection ofjudicial review of failure to act. See Sunstein,
Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 653 (1985). For lower
court decisions, see Air Line Pilots Ass'n. v. CAB, 750 F.2d 81 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Bargmann v.
Helms, 715 F.2d 638 (D.C. Cir. 1983); WWHT, Inc. v. FCC, 656 F.2d 807 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1979). See also
Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Comm'r, FDA, 740 F.2d 21, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Cf
Montana v. Clark, 749 F.2d 740, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (reviewing decision not to amend long.
standing rules after notice and comment period).
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to regulate. 198 Political checks are insufficient safeguards against
that prospect, even when lax enforcement is not intended by
Congress.' 99 Judicial review at the behest of beneficiaries, no
less than review at the behest of members of the regulated class,
may increase the likelihood of agency fidelity to statutory standards. The second perception is that the interests of regulatory
beneficiaries deserve no less legal protection than those of theregulated. 200 The role of the courts is no longer to protect private autonomy alone.
One way to take the Madisonian understanding more seriously would be for courts to reform the doctrines of standing,
reviewability, and scope of review so as to treat the beneficiaries
20
of regulation generally in the same way as regulated entities. '
By thus applying the hard-look doctrine, this reformulation
would generate a public law independent of private law rules. It
would amount to the administrative law analogue of the general
shift in constitutional law from Lochner era understandings to the
current emphasis on the deliberative process found in some of
the modem cases.
B.

Critiques

We have seen that if the Madisonian conception were used as
a basis for judicial review of legislative and administrative action,
there would be considerable doctrinal movement. Moreover, the
movement would be in directions that have strong historical support. But the proposals might be criticized on two fronts, both of
which raise large and difficult issues.
198. See Stewart, supra note 3. Cf Stigler, supra note 6 (suggesting that such capture is
sometimes intended by Congress).
199. See R. LrA & W. NoRDHAus, supra note 129. An important factor, often overlooked in debates concerning the value ofjudicial review of agency action, see, e.g., J. MASHAW,
BuREAUCRATncJUSTICE (1983),is the deterrent effect of the prospect ofjudicial review on reg-

ulators during the initial decisionmaking process. The prospect of review often serves as a
central guarantor of fidelity to procedural and substantive norms-a fact that will be missed if
one focuses only on the reported cases, where, to be sure, the courts make their share of
mistakes. See R. MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE CouRTs: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACr

(1983).
200. Such perceptions are reflected in changes in the law of standing, see Association of
Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); of procedural due process,
see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); and of reviewability, see Adams v. Richardson,
480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
201. See note 197 supra; see also Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439
F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971).

HeinOnline -- 38 Stan. L. Rev. 75 1985-1986

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

1.

[Vol. 38:29

The viability of Madisonianrepresentation.

The first criticism, substantive in nature, would suggest that it
is utopian to believe that representatives can be forced into the
deliberative Madisonian mold. In this view, history shows that
representatives, even at the national level, are unable to carry out
the relevant tasks. Madisonian republicanism may be as romantic
and outmoded as the face-to-face governance promoted by the
antifederalists. The proposed judicial role would therefore be
futile. At most, it would produce "boilerplate"-rationalizations
designed to placate the courts-rather than a genuine critical in202
quiry into issues of value and fact.
Moreover, the failure of representatives to act deliberatively
may be a positive good, for it guarantees their accountability to
the electorate. One person's factional tyranny may, in the view of
another, be the system of accountability in action. Requiring deliberation on the part of governmental officials might remove the
salutary check of constituent pressures. The virtue of majority
rule, in this view, consists precisely in mechanical official responses to the desires, or power, of the citizenry. Defects in the
processes of pluralism should be remedied with an effort to increase access to government authority for those who are otherwise unable to participate, rather than by requiring politics to
20 3
assume a deliberative form.
A final critique would stress that in view of the limitations of
deliberation, at least under conditions of widespread social, economic, and political inequality, it is necessary to supplement or
replace deliberative politics with exercises of power on the part
or in the interest of the disadvantaged.20 4 Requiring deliberation
does little to accelerate social change and may, in fact, strengthen
the status quo by legitimizing purely "political" decisions of the
legislature. In this view, Madisonian republicanism fails to address the most important problems in contemporary democracy.
202. SeeJ. ELY, supra note 22. Cf J. ELSTER, supra note 12 (discussing this attack).
203. This is of course the solution of Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. See generally
Ely, supra note 22. But see M. HORKHEIMER, ECLIPSE OF REASON 26-30 (1947).
An alternative critique of Madisonian republicanism stresses that, unlike classic republicans, Madison discounted the possibility that citizens generally might engage in the deliberative processes of government. In Madison's view, that task could be accomplished only by
representatives. See B. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY (1984). The discussion here does not
deal with this particular debate-between classical and Madisonian republicans-but instead
focuses on the differences between Madisonian republicanism and pluralism.
204. SeeJ. KEANE, supra note 124.
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2. Institutionalproblems.
A different critique would focus on institutional concerns
about judicial competence and authority. The first claim in this
connection is that existing sources of law fail to vest courts with
the power to undertake the proposed tasks. The equal protection clause and the Administrative Procedure Act-the principal
sources of authority for the proposed judicial innovations-are
far from open-ended grants of authority to move legislative and
administrative processes in Madisonian directions.20 5 Nor, in this
view, are courts well-suited for the task. The job of ascertaining
the extent of factional control over legislative processes involves
unmanageable inquiries into legislative motivation and the drafting process. Even individual legislators almost always act on the
basis of mixed motivations. Conceptions of the public good and
the desire to be reelected are inseparably intertwined. The problem becomes truly intractable when the issue is the "motivation"
of a multimember decisionmaking body. In such circumstances,
the notion of motivation becomes incoherent; another basis for
analysis is necessary. 206 Finally, there is little reason to believe
that courts are themselves immune from "ideology." The history
of Anglo-American law suggests the opposite. Nor is it clear that
a neuthere is such a thing as "reasoned analysis," constituting
20 7
tral standpoint from which to assess social issues.
These are formidable objections. They suggest, above all,
that it is unrealistic to believe that courts might on their own
make significant progress in moving legislation and administration in Madisonian directions. But the objections are not insurmountable. It will be possible to sketch only the outlines of a
response here.
The first point is that the existing work in economics and
political science suggests that interest groups play an important
205. Cf Easterbrook, Legal Interpretationand the Power of theJudiciary, 7 HARv.J.L. & PuB.

PoL'v 87 (1984) (emphasizing the need to trace judicial decisions to independent sources of
authority).
206. There are many such attacks on motivation-centered inquiries in American law. See,
e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224 (1971); Exparte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506,
514 (1869); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). For a recent discussion, see Ackerman, supra note 24. See also Brest, Palmer v. Thompson; An Approach to the Problemof Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup. CT. REV. 95; Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in
ConstitutionalLaw, 79 YALE LJ. 1205 (1970).
207. Cf M. FOUCAULT, supra note 123 (discussing relationship between power and production of knowledge).
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but not decisive role in most modem regulation.20 There are
gradations of interest-group pressure; other factors contribute to
legislative outcomes. In these circumstances, courts might well
be able to push politics in particular directions. Invalidation of
the statute in Fritz,20 9 for example, would have served a valuable
function both in the particular case and in warning legislators
against the delegation of government power to private groups.
The claim of utopianism is therefore overstated.
Requiring justifications does not, to be sure, guarantee "reasoned analysis" on the part of the legislature. Boilerplate, representing not the actual process of decision but instead a necessary
bow to the courts, is hardly an unambiguous good and would
undoubtedly be increased by the proposed requirements. But requiring justifications does serve an important prophylactic function. 210 The history of administrative and constitutional law is
filled with examples.2 11 To some degree, there will be boilerplate. But identification of the legitimate public purposes purportedly served by statutory classifications should improve
representative politics by ensuring that the deliberative process is
focused on those purposes and the extent to which the classifications serve them-a point to which I return below.212 In any
event, procedural requirements occasionally have substantive
consequences. Identification of the actual purposes served by a
statute may, for example, diminish the likelihood of its enactment. Fritz213 may itself be an illustration: It is uncertain whether
the statute would have been passed had Congress been aware of
its effects on the vested rights of certain employees.
Moreover, the equal protection clause has always been understood as a requirement ofjustification for classifications, and that
requirement is directed above all at decisions based solely on
political power. The suggestion here is to take that understanding-explicit in current law and with roots in Madisonian principles of representation-more seriously. The same reasoning
applies to the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act
208. See A. MAss, supra note 81 (attacking interest-group theories of congressional behavior); notes 78-81 supra and accompanying text.
209. 449 U.S. 166 (1980).
210. See Friendly, Chenery Revisited Reflections on Reversal and Remand of Administrative Orders, 1969 DuxE LJ. 199.
211. See Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 137, at 1283 & n.379.
212. See text accompanying notes 225-238 infra.
213. 449 U.S. 166 (1980).
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that create a general requirement that agencies support their de214
cisions in terms of statutorily relevant factors.
There is an apparent anomaly in relying on principles of
Madisonian republicanism as a basis for a vigorous judicial
role. 21 5 Those principles are rooted in a conception of politics
which does not easily accommodate judicial intrusions. But
those intrusions become defensible when they are based on constitutional and statutory provisions whose purpose and effect are
to improve a political process that amounts in the circumstances
to lawmaking by powerful private groups. The judicial role outlined here is hardly desirable in the abstract, and it need not be
exclusive; it is justified in part by the need for some institution of
government to incline politics in Madisonian directions.
Perhaps more fundamentally, the original constitutional
framework was based on an understanding that national representatives should be largely insulated from constituent pressures.
Such insulation, it was thought, would facilitate the performance
of the deliberative functions of government. That system of insulation has broken down with the decline of the electoral college,
direct election of senators, and, most important, technological
developments that have enabled private groups to exert continuing influence over representatives. In these circumstances, it is
neither surprising nor inappropriate that the judicial role has expanded and that some of the deliberative tasks no longer performed by national representatives have been transferred to the
courts.
It is true that the evidentiary difficulties are considerable in
ascertaining legislative and administrative motivation. But they
are not substantially more troublesome than those involved in
determining whether voting requirements or tests are motivated
by racial discrimination-a conventional judicial inquiry. 21 6 The
concept of legislative motivation is as much ajudicial construct as
it is an inquiry into some actual state of mind. 21 7 No unitary legislative motivation underlies statutory enactments; in identifying
the relevant motivation, courts are, to some degree, creating a
214. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
215. Cf Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979 WASH.
U.L.Q. 695 (criticizing theories of judicial role justifying efforts to improve political

processes).
216. See, e.g., City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364
U.S. 339 (1960).
217. See Moore, The Semantics ofJudging, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 151, 246-70 (1981).
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fiction. But so long as the difficulties are recognized, a standard
that relies on legislative motivation is likely to be a better means
218
of implementing the constitutional safeguards discussed here
than any of the possible alternatives.
One alternative route, for example, would be to make constitutional outcomes turn not on motivation but on the existence of
legitimate reasons for government action.2 19 Under this view, it
would not matter, for example, whether the legislature "in fact"
adopted a statute barring the use of plastic milk cartons to protect the paper industry or instead to guard against environmental
degradation. 220 What matters is that the latter justification is
available as a response to those who have been harmed; the availability of that response is sufficient for validation. Similarly, it
would not matter whether a written test for employment as police
officers has been adopted to prevent blacks from qualifying or to
22
ensure quality among those employed. '
The inferiority of this approach stems from the fact that the
actual, as opposed to hypothetical, reasons for government action make an important difference. "[Elven a dog," as Justice
Holmes said, "distinguishes between being stumbled over and
being kicked." 222 The analogy to private law is imperfect, but in
the context of legislative motivation, the difference is relevant in
two respects. First, it may be important to those disadvantaged
by the classification. If the disadvantage is the incidental consequence of a measure designed to promote legitimate goals, the
injury is of a different nature from that produced by a deliberate
218. Some constitutional protections apply regardless of legislative motivation. "Fundamental rights," for example, are protected regardless of the end government is trying to
pursue.
219. This is proposed in Ackerman, supra 24, at 740-46. It is also reflected in occasional
suggestions by the Supreme Court that it is irrelevant whether the legitimate reason actually
produced the result in question. See, e.g., Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612 (1960).
Another alternative focuses on effects rather than motives or reasons at all. That approach suffers from familiar difficulties, see Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-48 (1976),
though in the racial context those difficulties are not insuperable. In that context, reluctance
in adopting an effects test stems in part from a Lochner-like reluctance to understand the extent to which present outcomes are a product of past governmental choices. See Perry, The
DisproportionateImpact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 540 (1977).
220. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981); see also Fritz, 449 U.S.
at 179 (suggesting that "actual" motivation is irrelevant).
221. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
222. See 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 3 (1881).
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effort to exclude or harm a group. 223
Second, and more fundamentally, the difference is relevant to
the exercise of legislative responsibility, which, as we have seen,
is a principal focus of the equal protection clause. That clause is
largely an effort to ensure that certain reasons do not play a role
in government decisions; it is rooted in a desire to ensure that if
one person or group is to be treated differently from another, it
must be as a result of a particular form of legislative deliberation.
That understanding stems in turn from a perception, dealt with
in more detail below, 224 that a legislature that deliberates is more
likely to develop desirable laws than one that responds to existing constituent pressures. If legislative responsibility, understood in these terms, is the major concern, the actual motives for
legislative action assume central importance. And it is often possible, notwithstanding the problems of mixed motivations and
the evidentiary difficulties, to discern the dominant motivation by
using conventional techniques.2 25 In this context, all solutions
are imperfect, but it is better to struggle with the evidentiary
problem than to uphold all government action when a non-invidious justification can be hypothesized, or strike down all such action when an invidious purpose is plausibly at work.
The final question deals with the viability of Madisonian republicanism. Was Madison correct in his rejection of pluralist
approaches to politics in favor of an understanding that relies on
the existence of a common good distinct from the aggregation of
private interests? Would it be more desirable to perfect the
processes of pluralism than to adopt a deliberative model of politics? To answer these questions would require an elaborate
statement, 226 but some of the relevant considerations may be
outlined here.
A pluralist approach to politics views private preferences as
exogenous variables and will not subject them to critical scrutiny
223. Sometimes, of course, those disadvantaged by statutory dassifications are unaware
of the legislative motivation.
224. See notes 226-239 infra and accompanying text. Identifying motives also promotes
political accountability by focusing the deliberative process, and public scrutiny, on those
motivations.
225. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977); Moore, supra note 217, at 246-70.
226. See generally R. BERNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 207-31 (1983); T. SPRAGENS, THE IRONY

OF LIBERAL REASON (1981); Pitkin, Justice: On Relating Private and Public, 9 POL. THEORY 327
(1981).
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and review. Under a pure version of the pluralist understanding,
the representative responds mechanically to constituent pressures. Those pressures are in turn a product of the existing distribution of wealth, the existing set of entitlements, and the
existing structure of preferences. But all three may be objectionable to some degree or another; the task of political actors, either
representatives or citizens, is to reflect critically on them, not
necessarily to accept them.
Two premises are implicit in this claim. The first is that some
preferences are either objectionable or, more generally, the
product of distorting circumstances. The second is that through
the process of deliberation and debate, objectionable or distorted preferences might be revealed as such. Preferences are of
course shaped by the available opportunities and the existing allocation of power. The phenomenon of "sour grapes" 227 reflects
the fact that in some circumstances people reject opportunities
because they perceive them to be unavailable. Preferences adapt
to the available options; they are not autonomous. 228 In these
circumstances, politics properly has, as one of its central functions, the selection, evaluation, and shaping of preferences, not
simply their implementation. 229 For this reason, the Madisonian
ideal is likely to result in better laws than an approach that takes
for granted the existing distribution of wealth, power, and entitlements as well as the existing set of preferences. There is, in
short, something like a "common good" or "public interest" that
may be distinct from the aggregation of private preferences or
utilities.28 0
Legislators operating in Madisonian fashion are not prohib227. See generallyJ. ELSTER, supra note 12; see also R. BRANDT, A THEORY OF THE GOOD AND
(1979).

THE RIGHT

228. The phenomenon of endogenous changes in preferences is one with which public

choice theorists have only begun to come to terms. See, e.g., Von Weizsacker,Notes on Endogenous Change in Tastes, 3 J. ECON. THEORY 345 (1971); Yaari, Endogenous Changes in Tastes: A
Philosophical Discussion, in DECISION THEORY AND SOCIAL ETHICS 59 (H. Gottinger & W.
Leinfellner eds. 1976).
229. SeeJ. ELSTER, MAKING SENSE OF MARX (1985) (comparing the goal of self-realization

with satisfaction of consumption choices).
230. See J. ELSTER, supra note 12; M. HORKHEIMER, supra note 203, at 26-30; Sax, The
Claimsfor Retention of the Public Lands, in RETHINKING THE FEDERAL LANDS 125 (S.Brubaker ed.

1984).
Conventional lawyers' approaches to majority rule, as a system of aggregating preferences, fail
to come to terms with well-established conundrums in developing a social welfare
function. See K. ARRow, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 22-33 (2d ed. 1963) (impossibility of aggregating preferences); A. FELDmAN, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND SOCIL CHOICE

HeinOnline -- 38 Stan. L. Rev. 82 1985-1986

November 1985]

INTEREST GROUPS

ited from deciding that in some settings their role is to maximize
aggregate utility, defined by reference to public desires. A considered utilitarian judgment on the part of the legislature is
hardly impermissible in all contexts. But it would require a singularly optimistic view of politics to suggest that there is an identity between the result that would be reached by the considered
utilitarian legislator and that which would result from responses
to constituent pressures as they are generally imposed. 231 There
is a significant difference between the legislator responding
mechanically to constituent pressures and the legislator who, deliberating in Madisonian fashion, acts as a considered utilitarian.
And even if aggregation of preferences could be obtained
through pluralist politics,232 the appeal of pluralism is under-

mined by the fact that the legislator should reflect on constituent
preferences-a principle embodied in familiar efforts to transform preferences through representative government, as in the
case of antidiscrimination laws.
In the pluralist understanding, the notion of a distinctive
common good becomes tyrannical or mystical: tyrannical, because pluralists see the change of preferences, or the subordination of private interests to the public good, as inevitably coercive
and rarely the product of reasoned argument; mystical, because
pluralists take private preferences as exogenous variables. 233 But
those who regard the transformative or deliberative function of
politics as a central feature will have sympathy for Madisonian
conceptions of governance.
The second point is that a deliberative politics will make it
less likely that official action will be produced solely for privateregarding reasons. Such reasons are by hypothesis an insufficient
basis for legislation; citizens and officials must appeal to a
broader public good. 23 4 This requirement will in turn increase
THEORY 202-10 (1980) (discussing demonstration by Gibbard and Satterthwaite that no plausible procedure of social choice is strategy-prool).
231. But cf Becker, supra note 18 (arguing that interest-group tradeoffs are more likely
to promote economic welfare than alternatives).
232. See note 230 supra.
233. See S. HOLMES, BENJAMIN CONSTANT AND THE MAKING OF MODERN LIBERALISM
7
(1984); A. MACINTYRE, supra note ;J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY

(1950) (attacking notion of a "public interest"); T. SPRAGENS, supra note 226.
234. See Tocqueville's somewhat overstated claim that:
When the public is supreme, there is no man who does not feel the value of public
good-will, or who does not endeavour to court it by drawing to himself the esteem
and affection of those amongst whom he is to live. Many of the passions which con-
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the likelihood that the public good will in fact emerge from politics. The requirement that measures be justified rather than simply fought for has a disciplining effect on the sorts of measures
that can be proposed and enacted. At the same time, this requirement will make it more likely that citizens and legislators
will act for public-regarding reasons.
Both of these consequences are far from certainties. To a
substantial degree, citizens and representatives will generate
public-regarding justifications that are largely a mask for self-interest. 235 Moreover, social, political, and economic inequalities

will have significant consequences for the potential of rational
deliberation. 23 6 Under current or perhaps even ideal conditions,
a deliberative politics is an imperfect guarantee of public-regarding outcomes. But by disciplining the kinds of reasons that may
be offered in support of legislation, it increases the likelihood
23 7
that they will come about.

All this is hardly to argue for the existence of a unitary public
good, especially in a society consisting of disparate groups with
competing interests. The requirement of deliberation does not
exclude compromises among those with different conceptions of
appropriate government ends. 238 But it does demand that repre-

sentatives engage in some form of discussion about those ends,
geal and keep asunder human hearts, are then obliged to retire, and hide below the
surface. Pride must be dissembled; disdain does not break out; selfishness is afraid
of itself. Under a free government, as most public offices are elective, the men whose
elevated minds or aspiring hopes are too closely circumscribed in private life, constantly feel that they cannot do without the population which surrounds them. Men
learn at such times to think of their fellow-men from ambitious motives, and they
frequently find it, in a manner, their interest to be forgetful of self.
A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, in J. MILL, PoLrrIcs AND SOCIETY, 186, 222-23 (G.
Williams ed. 1976); see also W. NELSON, ONJUSTIFYING DEMOCRACY (1980). This conception of
public life parallels the conception emerging from recent feminist writing. See N. HARTSOCx,
MONEY, SEX AND POWER (1983) (criticizing pluralism); H. PrrKiN, FoRTuNE IS A WOMAN
285-327 (1984) (discussing "Machiavelli at his best").
235. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 1 (A. Hamilton) & 10 (J. Madison);J. DIGGINS, supra note
27.
236. SeeJ. HABERmAS, Reply to My Critics, in CgrrcAL DEBATES, supra note 124, at 221;J.
ELSTER, supra note 11, at 44 (if "free and rational discussion will only be possible in a society
where political and economic domination have been abolished, it is by no means obvious that
abolition can be brought about by rational argumentation").
237. SeeJ. ELSTER, supra note 12, at 35-42 (discussing and criticizing this daim).
238. See H. PrrnaN,supra note 234, at 299-304; Rawls,Justiceas Fairness: PoliticalNot Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PuB. ArF. 223 (1985); see also B. ACKERMAN, supra note 16, at 249-50; cf B.
BARBER, supra note 203 (distinguishing between "unitary" and "strong" democracy); P. Brest,
The Constitution of Democracy (1984) (unpublished manuscript) (distinguishing between
ideal of the polis and "discursive participation").
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rather than responding mechanically to political power or to existing private preferences.
These considerations suggest that an active judicial posture in
pursuit of republican goals may be both desirable and legitimate.
That posture has firm roots in history and existing law; and it
might move politics in appropriate directions. It may be utopian
to suppose that courts can bring about a political process like
that anticipated by Madison and his federalist allies. But they are
capable of generating movement in that direction.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The federalist understanding of politics, though not pluralist,
represented a sharp break from the thrust of previous republican
thought-especially in its hostility to the small republic, its hopes
for public-spirited representation, and, perhaps above all, its
skepticism about the likelihood that civic virtue would be a significant remedy for the problem of faction. At the same time, the
federalists accepted the republican belief that private and public
interests are distinct and that the structure of government should
lead political actors to pursue a general public good. The federalist solution to the problem of faction relied on control of the
governmental process by a group of public-spirited representatives who would be subject to electoral supervision and to vari-

ous other safeguards.
Much of modern legal doctrine focuses on the same theme.
In particular, large areas of constitutional and administrative law
are concerned with the problems raised by the influence of powerful private groups over legislative and administrative processes.
Modern rationality review attempts to ensure that representatives
have acted to promote the public good and not solely in response
to political pressure. Stricter constitutional review can be understood, at least in part, as an effort to subject public value justifications to critical scrutiny. In administrative law, judge-made
doctrines may be seen as an attempt to diminish the authority of
powerful private groups over the regulatory process, ensuring
that regulatory decisions are reached through a process of deliberation about statutorily relevant factors. These requirements
amount to an effort to promote the Madisonian conception of
politics and representation without according special protection
to private property or private ordering.
We have also seen that, if taken seriously, these themes might
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serve as the basis for important doctrinal innovations. Judicial
scrutiny of the legislative process might take the form of a more
serious inquiry into both process and outcome, designed to ensure that what emerges is genuinely public rather than a reflection of existing relations of private power. Developments in
administrative law might provide the basis for a set of doctrines
designed to undermine the power of particular groups over the
administrative process. The judicial role would take the form,
not of protecting traditional private rights, but of creating a process of decision designed to ensure against the likelihood that
private groups will be able to usurp government power to distribute wealth or opportunities in their favor.
It would be a mistake to suggest that courts should play an
exclusive role in performing these tasks, and it would be fanciful
to believe that, on their own, courts could successfully respond to
the problem of factional power over lawmaking processes. Nonjudicial institutions must be encouraged to respond to that problem as well. But the special role for courts might be justified on
the ground that judicial insulation provides an opportunity for
critical scrutiny of citizen preferences-in Madison's terms, refinement and enlargement of the public view-rather than their
mechanical implementation. In this respect, a relatively active judicial role is designed to fulfill the purposes of the original constitutional scheme, which attempted to insulate national
representatives in order to facilitate the performance of their deliberative tasks.
All of these suggestions are subject to formidable objections.
The considerable trust they repose in the federal judiciary may
be misplaced. 23 9 At the same time, acceptance of the Madisonian
conception would perpetuate the understanding, fundamental to
the constitutional scheme, that the antifederalist view of politics
and human nature is romantic and anachronistic. That view was
based on belief in the possibility that citizens as well as representatives would be able to engage in the essential tasks of politics.
Much was lost-even if much was also gained-with the adoption
of the federalist skepticism about the deliberative capacity of the
citizenry at large. Views resembling those of the antifederalists
have enjoyed something of a revival in recent years, 240 and such
239. See D. HORowrrz, THE COURTS AND SOCLdM
Potacy (1977); J. MASHAW, supra note
199.
240. See J. K

, supra note 124; Brest, The FundamentalRights Controversy: The Essential
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views would imply a conception of politics and of the judicial role
that is as distinct from the Madisonian understanding as the
Madisonian understanding is distinct from modem pluralism.
To those sympathetic to the antifederalist conception, the Madisonian approach will seem at most a second-best substitute.
From another direction, it might be suggested that the Madisonian conception of politics, and especially its republican roots,
have themselves become anachronistic. The notion that representatives might engage in the deliberative task of which the federalists spoke seems increasingly romantic with the declining
belief in civic virtue and with the mounting authority of powerful
private groups over the processes of government. But as the bicentennial of the Constitution approaches, it is especially important to appreciate the grounds on which Madison and his peers
stopped short of pluralist approaches, and sought a system in
which private preferences are subjected to critical evaluation.

Contradictions of Normative ConstitutionalScholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1105-09 (1981); Frug,
supra note 157; Sandel, Introduction, in LIBERALISM AND ITS CRMCS, supra note 7; Walker, A
Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy, 60 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 285 (1966).
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